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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Betty Layne DesPortes
Steven D. Benjamin**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article discusses holdings and trends in the published
cases of the Virginia Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
of Virginia from August 1996 to July 1997. Although the form
of this article generally follows the same form used by prior
authors, several subject headings have been renamed to reflect
the current focus of the courts. For example, during this period
the court of appeals grappled with the "community caretaker"
doctrine, bifurcated sentencing proceedings in felony cases, jury
selection, and various hearsay exceptions. The supreme court
addressed an indigent defendant's right to expert assistance,
administrative license suspensions, and speedy trial issues.
I.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

A. Community Caretaker
The Virginia Court of Appeals continues to advance the "community caretaker" function of police officers to justify intrusions
upon individual privacy.1 In three cases, Terry v. Common* Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B-A.S., 1989, University of
South Carolina; J.D., 1992, University of Virginia School of Law; M.S., Forensics,
1993, Virginia Commonwealth University.
** Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. BA, 1976, East Carolina
University; J.D., 1979, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. The Virginia Court of Appeals previously defined the community caretaker

function as a duty which "extends beyond the detection and prevention of crime, to
embrace also an obligation to maintain order and to render assistance." Barrett v.
Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 773, 777, 447 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1994) (en banc), rev'd on
other grounds, 250 Va. 243, 462 S.E.2d 109 (1995). The court of appeals recently

noted, however, that Barrett was overruled because the evidence did not support a
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wealth,2 Commonwealth v. Thornton,' and Wood v. Commonwealth,4 the court of appeals approved law enforcement actions
as "a medical information search,"5 "exigent circumstances"
surrounding a fire report,6 and "community caretaking."7

In Terry, an officer was dispatched on a medical emergency
call. He found the defendant gasping for air, unable to speak,
and blue in the face.' After the medical team arrived, the officer searched the defendant's belongings for identification in
order to "locate medical information and to determine the cause
of Terry's condition."9 The officer found rolling papers, a cigarette pack, and an inhaler.'0 Suspecting marijuana use to be
the cause of the defendant's condition, the officer opened the
cigarette pack and discovered marijuana. On appeal, the defendant conceded that the officer had authority to conduct a medical information search, but argued that the purpose of officer's
search of the cigarette pack was to search for evidence of a
crime and not for medical information. 1'
The court of appeals could find no support for the defendant's
position in the record. 2 Although the officer stated that he
associated the rolling papers with marijuana, and he concluded
that marijuana use may have caused the defendant's condition,
the court of appeals found the officer "had no information and
no reason to suspect any criminal activity" and concluded that
his search of the cigarette pack was necessary to obtain medical
information."

"reasonable suspicion" that Barrett needed assistance, and that the Supreme Court of
Virginia did not specifically rule on the adoption of the community caretaker doctrine.
See Wood v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 654, 659 n.2, 484 S.E.2d 627, 629 n.2
(1997).
2. 23 Va. App. 87, 474 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
3. 24 Va. App. 478, 483 S.E.2d 487 (1997).

4. 24 Va. App. 654, 484 S.E.2d 627 (1997).
5. See Terry, 23 Va. App. at 90, 474 S.E.2d at 173.
6. See Thornton, 24 Va. App. at 484, 483 S.E.2d at 490.
7. See Wood, 24 Va. App. at 659, 484 S.E.2d at 630.
8. See Terry, 23 Va. App. at 88, 474 S.E.2d at 172.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 88, 474 S.E.2d at 172-73. The presence of the inhaler, suggesting
that the defendant was an asthmatic, and providing a reasonable, innocent explanation to the defendant's condition, was not considered by the officer and the court.
11. See id. at 91, 474 S.E.2d at 174.
12. See id.
13. See id.
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Officers in Thornton were dispatched on an emergency fire
call. Firefighters entered the apartment and did not find a fire;
instead they found a pager that made the beeping noises neighbors believed to be a smoke alarm. The firefighters also discovered a large stack of cash and a marijuana cigarette. The
firefighters looked for smoldering fires and asked the officers to
secure the cash. The officers then observed the money and the
marijuana. After the firefighters left, "having found no one in
the apartment and no evidence of a fire,"'4 an officer checked
the rest of the apartment to "verify that no one was present
and for 'officer's safety sake." 5 In a bedroom, the officer saw
in plain view a gun and a white powder which he suspected to
be cocaine. 5
The Virginia Court of Appeals found that the firefighters and
the officers had a right to enter the apartment because of the
"exigent circumstances" of the fire report.'7 The court of appeals also found the search of the bedroom to be justified based
on the authority of officers to "conduct a limited security check
in those areas where individuals [who might destroy the evidence] could hide."' 8
In Wood, officers responded to the defendant's home to investigate his wife's complaint that he had beaten her. 9 The defendant was promptly arrested, and two officers stayed with his
sleeping children. After a social worker came for the children,
the officers searched the rest of the house, including the second
floor, where drugs and a gun were found in plain view. The
officers testified that they went upstairs to "secure the residence, [and] make sure there was nobody else there,"'0 and
that they were specifically looking for the defendant's teenage
stepson who had been reported missing several days before.2 '
Although they had not heard any noise upstairs, the officer did

14. Commonwealth v. Thornton, 24 Va. App. 478, 482, 483 S.E.2d at 487, 488

(1997).
15. Id. at 482, 483 S.E.2d at 489.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 484-85, 483 S.E.2d at 490.

18. Id. at 486, 483 S.E.2d at 491 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
19. See Wood v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 654, 484 S.E.2d 627 (1997).

20. Id. at 657, 484 S.E.2d at 629.
21. See id. at 658, 484 S.E.2d at 629.
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notice a "foul smell" and a light.2 Viewing the application of
the community caretaker function as a mixed question of law
and fact, the Virginia Court of Appeals found the search justified by the "community caretaker" function.' The court of appeals held that "[an officer may take appropriate action under
the community caretaker doctrine where the officer maintains a
reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on objective facts,
that such action is necessary."' The court focused on the
officers' "concern for the child they believed to be missing" and
determined that the search was not a "pretext for the investigation of criminal conduct."2
Given the court of appeals' steadfast adherence to the community caretaker doctrine and the authority of officers to intrude upon the privacy of individuals in assisting them, future
litigants may focus on the "[o]bjective reasonableness [that is]
the linchpin of determining the validity of [such] action.' In
the reported cases, officers stated that they were acting to secure information,2 7 secure the house," search for children,"
or protect officer safety," and the trial court's inquiry ended
there. Nevertheless, is it objectively reasonable to ignore an
inhaler and focus upon rolling papers to assume that marijuana
is the source of breathing difficulties? Is it objectively reasonable for officers to search an apartment for people after

22. See id. at 657, 484 S.E.2d at 628-29.
23. See id. at 662, 484 S.E.2d at 630.
24. Id. at 661-62, 484 S.E.2d at 631 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 663, 484 S.E.2d at 631. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Benton
maintained that the United States Supreme Court opinion in Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433 (1973), discussing the distinction between automobiles and residences in
determining reasonableness of searches, prohibits the community caretaker function
from justifying a warrantless intrusion into home. See Wood, 24 Va. App. at 664, 484
S.E.2d at 632 (Benton, J., dissenting). Even if the community caretaker fimction could
be applied to the warrantless search of a home, Judge Benton argued the officers'
explanation that they were simply looking for the missing child was doubtful since
they were searching for the child in the place from which he had been reported missing. By searching for the teenager at the home of his parents who had reported him
missing, "the officers obviously were conducting a criminal investigation." Id. at 667,
484 S.E.2d at 633 (Benton, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 662, 484 S.E.2d at 631 (quoting Commonwealth v. Waters, 20 Va. App.
285, 290, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1995)).
27. See Terry v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 87, 474 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
28. See Wood v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 654, 484 S.E.2d 627 (1997).
29. See id.
30. See Commonwealth v. Thornton, 24 Va. App. 478, 483 S.E.2d 487 (1997).
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firefighters have just conducted a similar search? Is it objectively reasonable to look for a missing child in the home of the
parents who reported him missing and not identify the search
as a criminal investigation? The court of appeals, giving "deference to the inferences the police officer draws from historical
facts with which he or she is faced,"3 answered in the affirmative in each case. Defense attorneys will need to vigorously
address related issues at the trial level in order to launch a
successful defense.
B. Hot Pursuitand Exception to "Knock and Announce"
The doctrine of "hot pursuit" and exceptions to the "knock
and announce" rule were also used this year by the Virginia
Court of Appeals to expand police powers. In Commonwealth v.
Talbert,32 the court of appeals relied upon a host of inferences
and assumptions to justify an officer's warrantless entry into a
home.'
In Talbert, the officers had observed a drug purchase on the
street. Although they decided to proceed against the purchasers
first, the officers were able to quickly locate the seller, the
defendant, as he was being lifted in his wheelchair into a
house.' When an officer reached the house to arrest the defendant, the exterior door was "open about a foot" and the inside door was completely open.35 The officer identified himself
in a loud voice, opened the exterior door, and went inside. The
officer arrested the defendant when the officer saw him drop a
rock of cocaine.36 The trial court suppressed the evidence based
on findings that the police were not in hot pursuit when they
entered the residence and that no other exigent circumstances
necessitated the officer's entry into the home." In determining
that there were no exigent circumstances, the trial court re31. Wood, 24 Va. App. at 662, 484 S.E.2d at 631.
32. 23 Va. App. 552, 478 S.E.2d 331 (1996).
33. The court of appeals also used inferences to justify a "no knock" entry into a
home to execute a search warrant in Spivey v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 715, 479
S.E.2d 543 (1997).
34. See Talbert, 23 Va. App. at 555, 478 S.E.2d at 333.
35. See i& at 556, 478 S.E.2d at 333.
36. See id.
37. See ad at 557, 478 S.E.2d at 333.
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ferred to the ten factors listed by the Supreme Court of Virgin8 and found that the Commonia in Verez v. Commonwealth,"
wealth had not established any of the ten factors, except probable cause to believe a crime had occurred."9
The Virginia Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the
defendant did not need to know he was being pursued for the
"hot pursuit" doctrine to apply.40 The court of appeals reasoned
that the defendant "might have learned the police were on his
tral ... might have eluded apprehension and might have disposed of the [evidence]."41 The court of appeals also identified
several "general exigent circumstances" which gave the officers
good cause to believe the defendant and the people with him
were armed: the evidence was easily disposable, the ownership
of the house was unknown, the officers did not know how long
the defendant would remain in the house, the officers had good
reason to believe the arrest of the purchasers would become
known, and a drug crime was involved.42 The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's suppression of the evidence, apparently giving no deference to the trial court's findings of fact concerning the existence of exigent circumstances."
In Spivey v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Court of Appeals
addressed whether police officers are entitled to enter the
defendant's house to execute a search warrant without knocking
and announcing their presence. Generally, police officers must

38. 230 Va. 405, 337 S.E.2d 749 (1985). The ten enumerated factors are: 1) the
urgency and the time required to get a warrant; 2) the reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed or destroyed; 3) danger to others, including police left to
guard the site; 4) information suggesting that the possessors of the contraband are
aware that the police may be on their trail; 5) whether the offense is serious or violent; 6) whether officers reasonably believe that the suspects are armed; 7) whether
there is a clear showing of probable cause at the time of entry; 8) strong reason to
believe that the suspects are present; 9) likelihood of escape if not swiftly apprehended; and 10) the suspects' recent entry into the premises after hot pursuit. See id. at
410-11, 337 S.E.2d at 753 (citations omitted).
39. See Talbert, 23 Va. App. at 557, 478 S.E.2d at 333.
40. See id. at 558, 478 S.E.2d at 334.
41. Id. at 560, 478 S.E.2d at 335 (emphasis added).
42. See id. at 560-61, 478 S.E.2d at 335.
43. See id. at 558, 478 S.E.2d at 334. The trial court found that there was no
reasonable belief that the contraband was about to be removed or destroyed, that
there was no likelihood of escape if not swiftly apprehended, and that the officers did
not reasonably believe that the suspect was armed. See id. at 557, 478 S.E.2d at 333.
44. 23 Va. App. 715, 479 S.E.2d 543 (1997).
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attempt to gain admittance to premises by announcing their
presence, identifying themselves as police officers and stating
their purpose.4 5 Officers are permitted to make an unannounced entry "where they have probable cause to believe that
their peril would be increased if they announced their presence
or that an unannounced entry is necessary to prevent persons
within from escaping or destroying evidence."' In Spivey, the
court of appeals found that the officers were entitled to enter
the premises without knocking because of the danger to police
officers.' The court of appeals discerned the requisite danger
from the assertions of the informant used to obtain the search
warrant." The informant reported that the defendant might
have a handgun, and that the defendant's supplier was her son
who lived nearby, frequently stayed with her, and had recently
been arrested for shooting into an unoccupied vehicle.4 9 Since
the son might have been in the house, the defendant and her
son might have had guns, and they might have been drug dealers, the court of appeals determined that the officers were justified in making the no-knock entry. 0
C. Good Faith
The Virginia Court of Appeals relied upon the officers' good
faith in Shears v. Commonwealth"1 and Barnette v. Commonwealth. 2 In Shears, the officers had an arrest warrant for
"Clyde Boyce" and attempted to lure him into custody by having an informant arrange a drug purchase with him.53 While
the officers were waiting to arrest Boyce, the defendant, David

45. See Heaton v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 137, 138, 207 S.E.2d 829, 830 (1974).
46. Spivey, 23 Va. App. at 722, 479 S.E.2d at 546 (quoting Heaton, 215 Va. at
138, 207 S.E.2d at 830).
47. See id. at 722, 479 S.E.2d at 547.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 723, 479 S.E.2d at 547.
50. See id The court of appeals also held that the omission of items from the
search warrant inventory did not require their suppression. See id. The preparation of
the inventory was required by Virginia Code section 19.2-57 and thus, the omission
did not implicate constitutional rights. See id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-57 (Repl. Vol.
1995 & Cum Supp. 1997).
51. 23 Va. App. 394, 477 S.E.2d 309 (1996).
52. 23 Va. App. 581, 478 S.E.2d 707 (1996).
53. See Shears, 23 Va. App. at 396, 477 S.E.2d at 310.
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Shears, arrived at the informant's mobile home and said "this
better not be no set up."' The officers, who testified they believed the defendant was Boyce based on the attending circumstances and his physical description, arrested him on the outstanding warrant and discovered drugs during a search incident
to the arrest.5 Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Boyce, the court of appeals held that "the only issue is
whether [Detective Payne's] mistaken belief that [Boyce] and
[the defendant] were one and the same person was reasonable
and in good faith."" The court of appeals found that under the
circumstances of the arranged drug transaction and the statement of the defendant, who matched the "general description"57 of Boyce, suggesting an impending drug transaction, the officers clearly acted in good faith, "albeit in error."5
In Barnette, a probation officer issued an arrest warrant on
August 17, 1994, because the defendant violated the conditions
of his parole." The probation officer, pursuant to office policy,
wrote "VOID AFTER 60 DAYS" on the warrant."° The officer
mistakenly believed that service was issued within the time
period shown on the warrant when he arrested the defendant
on October 17, 1994, the sixty-first day after the issuance of the
warrant.5 1 The trial court overruled the defendant's motion to
suppress drugs found in a search incident to arrest, holding
that the officer acted in good faith. " "An arrest made pursuant to a mistake of fact is valid if (1) the arresting officer believed, in good faith, that his or her conduct was lawful, and (2)
the arresting officer's good faith belief in the validity of the

54. Id. at 397, 477 S.E.2d at 310.

55. See id.
56. Id. at 399, 477 S.E.2d at 311 (quoting United States v. McEachern, 675 F.2d
618, 621 (4th Cir. 1982)).
57. Although the opinion of the court of appeals does not state the information
the officers had concerning Boyce's appearance, the term "general description" implies
the information contained in an arrest warrant, such as race, sex, age, height,
weight, age, eye and hair color.
58. Shears, 23 Va. App. at 400, 477 S.E.2d at 311.
59. See Barnette v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 581, 584, 478 S.E.2d 707, 708
(1996).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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arrest was objectively reasonable."' The Virginia Court of Appeals determined that sixty days is commonly regarded as two
months and the probation officer did not intend the warrant to
become ineffective after sixty days. Thus, the warrant was not
so facially deficient as to render the officer's good faith unreasonable.'
D. Investigatory Detentions
A court must consider the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether an officer has articulated a reasonable basis
to suspect criminal activity and justify an investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio." Cases involving the application of
this standard are based predominantly on a factual analysis
and are frequently decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals in
unpublished decisions because of the lack of "precedential value.' The court of appeals did issue published opinions in five
cases-two cases dealing with the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a detention, two cases involving reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect is armed and dangerous to
justify a frisk for weapons, and one case where the court avoided the analysis by imputing knowledge from an officer who had
probable cause to arrest.
Commonwealth v. Thomas67 is instructive in its treatment of
prior decisions of the Virginia Court of Appeals in Limonja v.
Commonwealth' and Deer v. Commonwealth.9 All three cases
involved a lawful stop for a traffic infraction and the use of
drug dogs.7" In each case, the detention surrounding the traffic
63. Id.
64. See id at 585-86, 478 S.E.2d at 707 (1996). In his concurring opinion, Judge
Elder found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the officer's good faith because the
probation officer's notation had no legal effect and thus, the warrant was valid. See
id. at 586, 478 S.E.2d at 707 (Elder, J., concurring). In another concurring opinion,
Judge Coleman agreed that the probation officer's language did not have legal effect;
however, he also found that the officer did act in good faith. See id. at 587, 478
S.E.2d at 709 (Coleman, J. concurring).
65. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see Freeman v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 460
S.E.2d 261 (1995).
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.010 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
67. 23 Va. App. 598, 478 S.E.2d 715 (1996).
68. 8 Va. App. 532, 383 S.E.2d 476 (1989).
69. 17 Va. App. 730, 441 S.E.2d 33 (1994).
70. Thomas also involved an issue of first impression: whether the Virginia Court
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infraction had terminated, or the consensual extension of the
traffic stop had been withdrawn. In Thomas, the defendant was
given a citation for having his bumper too low to the ground in
violation of Virginia Code section 46.2-1063. 7" The officer noticed an "odor of alcohol" and administered field sobriety tests,
which the defendant performed adequately. The officer instructed the defendant to sit on the curb while the drug dog
"sniffed" the car. Approximately one and a half minutes after
the issuance of the summons, the drug dog signaled a hit on
the car.72 The Virginia Court of Appeals found that the
officer's detection of the odor of alcohol on the defendant, the
defendant's nervous behavior (including locking the car door,
pacing, and becoming agitated and excited), and the fact that
the stop occurred at 11:00 p.m. in an isolated area, gave the
officer reasonable articulable suspicion7" to detain the defendant for the one and one-half minutes after completion of the
traffic summons that it took for the drug dog to signal a hit.74
Since the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion, the
court of appeals concluded that the defendant's case was controlled by Limonja and not by Deer.75 Additionally, the court of
appeals found that the defendant's reliance upon Deer was misplaced because Deer was required to wait for the arrival of the

of Appeals may review a prosecutor's certification, pursuant to Virginia Code section

19.2-398(2), that the evidence excluded is essential to the prosecution. See Thomas, 23
Va. App. at 605, 478 S.E.2d at 718; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-398(2) (Repl. Vol.
1995).
71. See Thomas, 23 Va. App. at 603, 478 S.E.2d at 717.
72. See id.
73. Exactly what criminal activity the officer suspected is unclear. Thomas passed
field sobriety tests and was not traveling a known drug route or in a known drug
area. The officer's observations do not seem to suggest any particular criminal activity.
74. See Thomas, 23 Va. App. at 613, 478 S.E.2d at 722.
75. See id. at 617, 478 S.E.2d at 721-22. In Limonja, the court held that the
officers had reasonable suspicion based on the defendant's traveling a known drug
route in a rental car, possession of a radar detector, lying about the reason for running a toll, nervousness, and confused and inconsistent answers regarding a package.
See Limonja, 8 Va. App. at 542, 383 S.E.2d at 482.
On the other hand, the court in Deer held that the defendant's nervousness
and hesitant, conflicting answer when asked to give his middle name and birth date
were not sufficient to justify detention because it constituted an "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" See Deer, 17 Va. App. at 736, 441 S.E.2d at 37
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
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drug dog, while the drug dog in Thomas was already present
when the officer finished writing the defendant's ticket.76
The Virginia Court of Appeals' opinion in Jones v. Commonwealth" firmly endorses an officer's subjective determination of
threatening circumstances. In Jones, the defendant was driving
when a passenger in his car gestured as though he were shooting a gun at two officers in an unmarked car.7" The
defendant's car then took a position immediately behind and to
the right of the unmarked car, a position the defendant maintained for twenty-five minutes even though the unmarked car
varied its speed from seventy to fifty miles per hour and
stopped at a stoplight. 9 Weeks earlier, the two officers in the
unmarked car had received information that a "contract" had
been placed on them and money paid for this purpose." One
of the officers testified that the defendant "looked very familiar
to one of the ones that [they] arrested [in the incident that
gave rise to the contract.]"8 The officers stopped the
defendant's car and discovered drugs during a consensual
search. 2
In asserting the error of the trial court in denying his motion
to suppress the evidence as the result of an unlawful seizure,
Jones relied on Bethea v. Commonwealth' for the proposition
that gestures and erratic driving are not, by themselves, sufficient to provide a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity." The court of appeals held that the reliance was misplaced because Bethea did not involve the lawfulness of the stop
of the vehicle.' Instead, Bethea involved the reasonableness of
the officer's ordering a passenger from a car.8" Considering the
76. See Thomas, 23 Va. App. at 612, 478 S.E.2d at 715. The practical interpretation of these cases might cause officers to radio ahead for the drug dog and to delay
the completion of the summons until the dog arrives. Protracting the writing of the
summons may have the added effect of angering the driver, possibly causing him to

"pace" and to become "excited" and "agitated."
77. 24 Va. App. 519, 484 S.E.2d 125 (1997).
78. See id. at 520, 484 S.E.2d at 125.
79. See id.

80. See id.
81. Id. at 521, 484 S.E.2d at 126.

82. See id.
83. 245 Va. 416, 429 S.E.2d 211 (1993).
84. See Jones, 24 Va. App. at 521, 484 S.E.2d at 126.
85. See id. at 521-22, 484 S.E.2d at 126.
86. See id. The vehicle in Bethea was lawfully stopped for a traffic infraction. The
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totality of the circumstances, including Jones' erratic driving,
the gestures of the passengers in the car, and the recently
reported threats, the court of appeals held that a particularized
and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed justifying
the investigative detention of the vehicle." The court of appeals found that the unprovoked harassment and intimidation
directed by Jones and his passengers at the officers created a
traffic hazard and a potentially dangerous situation."
In another case in which the Virginia Court of Appeals focused on the potential danger of a police-citizen encounter, the
court upheld a pat-down for weapons of a person suspected of
burglary, based solely on the nature of the offense. In Nelson v.
Commonwealth,89 the court of appeals held that
[b]urglary is a felony that clearly has the potential for or is
accompanied by violence.... The offender is subject to a
substantial penitentiary ter..... [Therefore,] [w]here bur-

glary is the crime for which the suspect is lawfully detained, it is not unreasonable for the investigating officer to
conduct a pat-down search.'
Burglary now has been added to drug crimes in the list of offenses that give officers virtually a per se right to conduct a
frisk for weapons. 9 '
The Virginia Court of Appeals has continued to oppose using
the characteristics of a particular location to justify intrusions
on Fourth Amendment rights where the officers have no other

officer ordered the passenger, Bethea, out of the car based in part on his prior gestures to a police officer. The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the totality of the
circumstances, including the safety of the officer, justified the intrusion on the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights that occurred when the officer asked him to
step out of the car. See Bethea, 245 Va. at 420, 429 S.E.2d at 213.
87. See Jones, 24 Va. App. at 523, 484 S.E.2d at 126.
88. See id. at 523, 484 S.E.2d at 126-27.
89. 24 Va. App. 823, 485 S.E.2d 673 (1997).
90. Id. at 827, 485 S.E.2d at 674-75 (citations omitted).
91. See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 354 S.E.2d 79, 87
(1987) (holding that suspicion of narcotics distribution is a circumstance which, standing alone, justifies a pat-down for weapons). The Supreme Court of Virginia previously upheld a pat-down for weapons of a burglary suspect where an officer testified
that, in his experience, one-fourth to one-half of all burglary suspects are armed. See
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 552, 554, 231 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1977).
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reasons to justify their actions. In Toliver v. Commonwealth,92
two uniformed officers approached both sides of the defendant's
vehicle while the defendant was parked legally in the Creighton
Court area of Richmond, Virginia.93 One of the officers said,
"let me see some hands," and then asked questions about the
ownership and registration of the vehicle." The defendant
gave several different answers before stating that his girlfriend
owned the vehicle. The defendant admitted that he did not
have a license and gave his proper name. In response to the
officer's questioning, the defendant denied having any drugs or
guns in the car, and consented to a search of the vehicle. After
Toliver exited the car, one of the officers conducted a pat-down
and discovered a weapon on the defendant.95 The Virginia
Court of Appeals held that the officer had no objectively reasonable basis for suspecting that the defendant was armed and
dangerous." The court of appeals pointed to the defendant's
cooperation and 9 7the officer's lack of information concerning
criminal activity.
E. Freedom of Movement
In two cases decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals, the
question of when the defendant was seized figured predomi-

92. 23 Va. App. 34, 473 S.E.2d 722 (1996).
93. See id. at 35, 473 S.E.2d at 723.
94. See id. at 36, 473 S.E.2d at 723-24. While the majority of the court found
that this constituted a consensual encounter, Judge Benton did not agree. See i&. at
37, 473 S.E.2d at 724 (Benton, J., concurring).
The Virginia Court of Appeals also found that an encounter was consensual in
another case where an officer instructed the defendant to "come over" to him and the
defendant stopped walking, turned to the officers, and let out a stream of profanity.
See Ford v. City of Newport News, 23 Va. App. 137, 141, 474 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1996).
Even though the defendant was only suspected of pushing a stolen bicycle, the court
of appeals emphasized the fact that the officers did not draw their guns or shine a
light on the defendant. See id. at 142, 474 S.E.2d at 850.
The better reasoning of Ford was that the officers lacked probable cause to
arrest the defendant for disorderly conduct where the defendant was loud and boisterous, throwing his arms in the air, but not using threatening words or gestures. See
id. at 144-45, 474 S.E.2d at 851-52. The court of appeals found that the defendant
was "loud, profane, and uncivil," but that his conduct did not have the direct tendency to incite violence required by the city code. Id. at 145, 474 S.E.2d at 852.
95. See Toliver, 23 Va. App. at 36, 473 S.E.2d at 724.

96. See id.
97. See id at 37, 473 S.E.2d at 724.
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nantly in the decision. In Thomas v. Commonwealth,98 the
court of appeals held that the defendant was not "seized" when
he stopped before reaching a roadblock and, therefore, the constitutionality of the roadblock was not an issue." The court of
appeals found that although the defendant was required by law
enforcement officers to stop in a line of traffic leading to a
roadblock on an exit ramp, the limiting of his "freedom of
movement" was not accomplished by intentional means."
Since the defendant was neither stopped "at the roadblock" nor
physically restrained "at the roadblock," and he did not submit
to the show of police authority,'' he was not seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 2 The majority rejected the contention of both the defendant and the dissent that
the roadblock created a "zone" that the defendant entered when
he was stopped by the line of traffic leading to the road03
block.

In White v. Commonwealth,' the seminal case of California v. Hodari D.0 5 was not mentioned, but perhaps should
have been. In Hodari D., the United States Supreme Court held
that an arrest requires one of two factors: either physical force
or submission to authority."e In White, the officer suspected
the defendant of driving with a suspended operator's license
and followed him to the driveway of his home. The officer activated his lights and the defendant "quickly exited his vehicle
and began walking rapidly away from his car."' 7 The officer
ordered the defendant back to his car and the defendant complied.' O8 The officer arrested the defendant for driving with a
suspended operator's license, searched the passenger compartment of the car, and discovered drugs in a paper bag between

98. 24 Va. App. 49, 480 S.E.2d 135 (1997) (en banc).
99. See id. at 54-55, 480 S.E.2d at 137-38.
100. See id. at 54, 480 S.E.2d at 137-38.
101. Id. Thomas stopped on the shoulder of the ramp thirty yards from the end of
the ramp where officers had set up the roadblock. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 55, 480 S.E.2d at 138.
104. 24 Va. App. 446, 482 S.E.2d 876 (1997).
105. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
106. See id. at 626.
107. White, 24 Va. App at 449, 482 S.E.2d at 877.
108. See id.
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the front seats." 9 The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the
search of the passenger compartment was justified under New
York v. Belton"0 because the defendant was a "recent occupant" of the vehicle and the search was incident to a lawful
arrest."' The fact that White was not "arrested" until he was
some distance from the car, and the distinction that the defendant in Belton was removed from the car only upon arrest,
apparently did not sway the court of appeals."
F. Miscellaneous
In Alvarez v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Court of Appeals applied the automobile exception to a bus to justify the
seizure
of a package of marijuana indicated as "hot" by a drug
4
dog."
In Perez v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the passage of eleven days between the sighting of a
vicious dog and procurement of a search warrant did not render
the information too stale to establish probable cause for the
search warrant."6
In Jones v. Commonwealth,"7 the Virginia Court of Appeals
found that the authority to search a jacket falling within the

109. See id.
110. 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that a search of the defendant's jacket incident
to a lawful custodial arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
111. See White, 24 Va. App. at 451, 482 S.E.2d at 878.
112. Other courts have found Belton inapplicable where the defendant was arrested
away from the car. See United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding Belton inapplicable where suspect suddenly parked car, jumped out, walked
quickly to motel, and was arrested thirty feet from car); State v. Foster, 905 P.2d
1032, 1037-38 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to read Belton to allow search when
arrest occurs outside vehicle); People v. Fernengel, 549 N.W.2d 361, 362 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1996), appeal denied, 552 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 112
(1997) (declining to apply Belton where defendant voluntarily left vehicle and was
stopped 20-25 feet away from it). Generally, the threat to officer safety that justified
the search of the passenger compartment as the "grabbable area" in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), is not present if the defendant is no longer in the car.
113. 24 Va. App. 768, 485 S.E.2d 646 (1997).
114. See id. at 775, 485 S.E.2d 649-50.
115. 25 Va. App. 137, 486 S.E.2d 578 (1997).
116. See id. at 142-43, 486 S.E.2d at 581.
117. 23 Va. App. 93, 474 S.E.2d 825 (1996).
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ambit of a search warrant was not dissipated when a visitor
took the jacket a few feet from the apartment."'
In Bynum v. Commonwealth,"' a small pocket where a key
was found was held to be within the scope of an express or
implied consensual search where the officer asked the defendant if he was involved in "narcotics trafficking," and then
asked for permission to search." °
In Price v. Commonwealth, 2 ' the court of appeals permitted
a warrant check on a passenger, who offered to drive away
from a roadblock, because the warrant check was part of the
driving record check and the standard procedure of the roadblock."
In Polston v. Commonwealth," the Virginia Court of Appeals found that a search warrant affidavit sufficiently established an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, where
the magistrate supplemented the information by questioning
the informant under oath."
III.

OTHER AMENDMENTS

A. Due Process and Equal Protection
In Husske v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a non-capital indigent defendant is entitled to
non-psychiatric expert assistance upon a particularized showing
of need for the assistance." The supreme court also held that
in showing a particularized need, the defendant must show that
he would be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.' 7 Un118. See id. at 98-99, 474 S.E.2d at 827-28.
119. 23 Va. App. 412, 477 S.E.2d 750 (1996).
120. See id. at 419, 477 S.E.2d at 754.
121. 24 Va. App. 496, 483 S.E.2d 496 (1997).
122. See id. at 499-501, 483 S.E.2d at 497-98.
123. 24 Va. App. 738, 485 S.E.2d 632 (1997).
124. See id. at 747-49, 485 S.E.2d at 636-37. Judge Benton dissented, arguing that
while the factors cited by the majority were persuasive in the abstract, the entire
context of the case undermined the warrant. See id. at 750-56, 485 S.E.2d at 738-41
(Benton, J., dissenting).
125. 252 Va. 203, 476 S.E.2d 920 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1092 (1997).
126. See id. at 213, 476 S.E.2d at 926.
127. See id.
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fortunately for Husske, the supreme court ignored his proffered
materials in assessing his particularized showing of need, but
did not ignore his subsequent confessions in assessing whether
he was prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance."
In Barnabei v. Commonwealth,"2 decided on the same day
as Husske, the Supreme Court of Virginia applied the same
standard of "particularized showing" and put the defendant in a
virtual "Catch-22." The defendant had asked for a forensic pathologist to assist in his defense and to rebut the testimony of
the medical examiner that the bruises and other injuries to the
victim occurred as the result of "violent penetration.""'0 The
supreme court held that the defendant failed to make the requisite showing because he only showed that he "suspected" an
expert might testify that the injuries did not necessarily result
from force. 3' Unfortunately, the defendant needed an expert
to examine the evidence in order to reach the desired conclusion. Without an expert, the defendant was unable to make the
showing necessary to obtain an expert.
The Virginia Court of Appeals applied the supreme court's
standard in Husske to the case of Hoverter v. Commonwealth, 3 ' where the defendant asked for mental health expert
assistance at sentencing. The court of appeals found that the
defendant failed to establish the requisite showing of need because he alleged no existing mental illness, demonstrated no
way that the services of the mental health expert might constitute a significant factor in his defense, showed no prejudice
from the denial, and did not explain why a detailed presentence
investigation report was insufficient to provide background and
circumstances of the crime."
128. See id. The defendant had challenged his confession as a product of compulsion in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights because it was made during the
course of court-ordered therapy that was part of a suspended sentence. The supreme
court found that the statements were voluntary and the obligation to cooperate with
his therapists did not render the situation one in which he had to choose between
incriminating himself and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent. See
id. at 217, 476 S.E.2d at 928-29.
129. 252 Va. 161, 477 S.E.2d 270 (1996).
130. See id at 170, 477 S.E.2d at 275.
131. See id. at 171, 477 S.E.2d at 276.
132. 23 Va. App. 454, 477 S.E.2d 771 (1996).
133. See id. at 466-67, 477 S.E.2d at 776. The case provides counsel a list of items
to prove if mental health expert assistance is requested in future cases. See id.
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In Walton v. Commonwealth,"M the defendant argued that
the suspension of his driver's license for conviction of possession
of marijuana violated his substantive due process rights."=
The Virginia Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that although
the right to operate a motor vehicle is a property interest, it is
not a constitutional right and, therefore, the suspension statute
need only be supported by a rational basis. 3 ' The
Commonwealth's identified purposes of deterring the use of
illegal drugs and the operation of motor vehicles by persons
under the influence of drugs were found to be proper purposes
reasonably related to the statute." 7 Even though the conviction did not relate to the use of the motor vehicle, the legislature could reasonably conclude that persons who possessed
illegal substances would drive under the influence and would
transport the drugs in their cars."
B. Double Jeopardy
In Weaver v. Commonwealth,"9 the defendant was indicted
by the Commonwealth for the charge of malicious wounding."4 Federal authorities indicted the defendant for conspiracy to murder and attempted murder of a witness, and the state
charge was given a nolle prosse.' After his acquittal on the
federal charges, the defendant was indicted by the Commonwealth for attempted murder.'
During jury deliberations, a
reporter contacted the prosecutor, who agreed to participate in
a call-in program in which the case was discussed." A juror
reported seeing the program and admitted that his ability to re-

134. 24 Va. App. 757, 485 S.E.2d 641 (1997).
135. See id. at 758, 485 S.E.2d at 642. The defendant also asserted that the suspension violated the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Because he failed to raise this ground in the trial court, the court of appeals barred consideration of that issue under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5A-18.
See id.
136. See id at 760, 485 S.E.2d at 642.
137. See id. at 760, 485 S.E.2d at 643.
138. See id. at 761, 485 S.E.2d at 643.
139. 25 Va. App. 95, 486 S.E.2d 558 (1997).
140. See id. at 97, 486 S.E.2d at 559.
141. See id. at 97-98, 486 S.E.2d at 559.
142. See id. at 98, 486 S.E.2d at 559.
143. See id.
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main impartial had been affected.' The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for a mistrial.' The defendant asserted that the subsequent retrial resulting in conviction was
barred by Virginia Code section 19.2-294 and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because of the prosecutor's
misconduct necessitating the mistrial.
The Virginia Court of Appeals held that Virginia Code section
19.2-294' applied only to subsequent prosecutions for statutory offenses, and since attempted murder was a common law
offense, the statute afforded the defendant no protection. 7
The court of appeals also held that the defendant's retrial was
not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.' While characterizing the prosecutor's conduct as "regrettable," the court of appeals found that the trial court's finding of fact, that the prosecutor did not intend to cause a mistrial, was supported by evidence that the prosecutor did not initiate contact with the reporter. 9
In miscellaneous cases asserting a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Virginia Court of
Appeals permitted the prosecution of a defendant for driving on
a suspended license after administrative impoundment of his
car for the same conduct, 5 ° allowed a protective order and a
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. The relevant language in Virginia Code section 19.2-294 provides: "[ilf the
same act be a violation of both a state and a federal statute a prosecution under the

federal statute shall be a bar to a prosecution under the state statute." VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-294 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
147. See Weaver, 25 Va. App. at 101, 486 S.E.2d at 560 (suggesting also why the
Commonwealth chose to indict for attempted murder, a Class 4 felony, rather than

the original statutory charge of malicious wounding, a Class 3 felony).
148. See id. at 103-04, 486 S.E.2d at 562.
149. See id.
150. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 443, 477 S.E.2d 765 (1996). After
a lengthy discussion, the Virginia Court of Appeals concluded that United States v.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2153 (1996), was controlling because the proceeding was against
property and was not intended to compensate the Commonwealth for harm. See Wilson, 23 Va. App. at 454, 477 S.E.2d at 770.

Applying the two-part test of Ursery, the court of appeals determined that the
legislature intended the sanction to be civil (summary administrative in rem proceeding following impoundment by officer, not judge) and that the sanction was non-punitive and remedial. See iaL The remedial ends were that the thirty days without a
vehicle might get the defendant "to change his antisocial lifestyle" and would keep
him from engaging in activity he was barred from undertaking. Id.
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criminal prosecution to be based on the same conduct, 5' determined that jeopardy in a bench trial does not attach when
opening statements are made or when the defense offers to
stipulate prior convictions,'52 and prevented a second criminal
contempt proceeding after the judge dismissed "all pending
show causes.""
The Supreme Court of Virginia dealt with the seven-day
license suspension following a refusal to submit to a breath or
blood test in both Brame v. Commonwealth'" and Simmons v.
Commonwealth.'55 In Brame, the supreme court held that a
seven-day administrative license suspension, combined with a
license suspension for one year for refusing to take a blood or
breath test, did not violate the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy. 55 The supreme court found both suspension
provisions to have overriding remedial purposes.5 7 Furthermore, the supreme court held that because the administrative
suspension is a civil proceeding, it could not bar a proceeding
under Virginia Code section 18.2-268.3 for refusing to take a
blood or breath test." In Simmons, the supreme court held
that a one-year license suspension was not barred under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel by the sevenday administrative license suspension.'59 The supreme court
ruled that the administrative suspension was not a judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, a condition prece-

151. See Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 475, 477 S.E.2d 781 (1996). The
Virginia Court of Appeals found the protective order to be remedial, not punitive,
because it protects against future abuse, rehabilitates the defendant by prohibiting
him from placing himself in a situation that could lead to abuse, and effects a reconciliation of the parties by preventing future conflict. See id. at 483, 477 S.E.2d at
784.
152. See Cummings v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 248, 481 S.E.2d 493 (1997).
153. Courtney v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 561, 478 S.E.2d 336 (1996). The
Virginia Court of Appeals found the dismissal of the pending show causes to be an
acquittal on the charge of criminal contempt and barred a second proceeding based
on a new show cause order for the same conduct. See id at 570, 478 S.E.2d at 33940.
154. 252 Va. 122, 476 S.E.2d 177 (1996).
155. 252 Va. 118, 475 S.E.2d 806 (1996).
156. See Brame, 252 Va. at 132, 476 S.E.2d at 183.
157. See id at 130-32, 476 S.E.2d at 182.
158. See id. at 132, 476 S.E.2d at 183.
159. See Simmons, 252 Va. at 121, 475 S.E.2d at 808.
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dent to the allowance of any plea in bar asserting either
doctrine."6
C. Joint Trials and Statements of Co-Defendants
The Virginia Court of Appeals narrowed the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation within the context of joint
trials and the admission of co-defendants' statements in several
cases this year, using the scope of hearsay exceptions to define
parameters of the constitutional protection and finding reliability in"every context.
In Raia v. Commonwealth, 6 ' the defendant was tried alone.
His co-conspirator was called by the Commonwealth to test*y.
When she asserted her Fifth Amendment rights, the Commonwealth introduced her confession, implicating both her and the
defendant, into evidence as a declaration against interest made
by an unavailable witness." The Virginia Court of Appeals
distinguished the case from Lee v. Illinois" and Bruton v.
United States,'6 which held that the admission of a codefendant's confession into evidence violated the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, because Lee and Bruton involved joint trials." The court of appeals found that the coconspirator's statement satisfied all of the requirements of the
"declaration against interest of an unavailable informant" exception to the hearsay rule." Furthermore, the court of appeals

160. See id. at 120, 475 S.E.2d at 807. Similarly, the Virginia Court of Appeals
held in Jones u. City of Lynchburg, 23 Va. App. 167, 474 S.E.2d 863 (1996), that a

general district court's finding that there was a lack of probable cause to arrest in an
appeal of a seven-day license suspension, did not bar the defendant's subsequent
prosecution for drunk driving. Because the issues of ultimate fact and the modes of
proof are different in the two proceedings, collateral estoppel did not bar the subsequent criminal prosecution. See d. at 172, 474 S.E.2d at 865-66.
161. 23 Va. App. 546, 478 S.E.2d 328 (1996).
162. See id at 550, 478 S.E.2d at 330.
163. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
164. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
165. See Raia, 23 Va. App. at 550, 478 S.E.2d at 330.
166.
A third party's statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if. (1) the declarant is unavailable, (2) the statement was

against the declarant's interest at the time it was made, and (3) the
declarant was aware at the time the statement was made that it was

against his interests to make it.
Id. (citations omitted). If the co-conspirator is repeatedly told by investigators that
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ruled that the statement was "reliable" because it implicated
the co-conspirator more than the defendant, 6 ' the co-conspirator voluntarily confessed, the statements of the defendant and
the co-conspirator were consistent in significant respects, the
statement was consistent with the physical evidence, and the
investigator's description of the co-conspirator's demeanor while
giving the statement supported a finding that the statement
was reliable." The court of appeals found that the admission
of the statement under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception
satisfied the requirements of the Confrontation Clause because
an "adversarial testing" would add little to its reliability.'69
In Randolph v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Court of Appeals eliminated the distinction of the joint trial, embracing the
same rules as applied in Raia. Randolph was tried jointly with
two co-defendants for grand larceny, credit card theft, and conspiracy to commit a felony.' One co-defendant told police
that they came to the airport "to steal [and] ... to pick pock-

ets."'72 The court of appeals again dismissed the Bruton objection, holding that Bruton did not apply where the statement
was admissible against the defendant under an exception to the
cooperating and making a statement is in their best interests, whether the declarant
knew the statement was against his interest should not be an "inescapable" conclusion.
167. Apparently, the court of appeals based this conclusion on the fact that the coconspirator said that the plan to shoot the victim "was more her idea than [the
defendant's]." Id. at 549, 478 S.E.2d at 329. She also said, however, that the defendant was the one who brought the gun and shot the victim. See id. at 549, 478
S.E.2d at 330.
168. See id. at 551, 478 S.E.2d at 330. The court of appeals did not describe the
co-conspirator's demeanor.
169. See id. at 551-52, 478 S.E.2d at 331.
170. 24 Va. App. 345, 482 S.E.2d 101 (1997).
171. The defendant asserted that the trial court's denial of his motion to sever was
error, but the court of appeals held that, because the statements objected to were
admissible against the defendant both in a joint trial and in separate trials, no actual prejudice resulted. See id. at 364, 482 S.E.2d at 110.
To be entitled to severance, a moving party must show actual prejudice would
result from a joint trial. Actual prejudice is the "serious risk that a joint trial would
compromise a specific trial right of [defendant], or prevent the jury from making a
reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Adkins v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App.
159, 163, 480 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1997) (citations omitted). In Adkins, the defendant
complained that the evidence was so contradictory that the defendants were forced to
take the stand to contradict each other. The Virginia Court of Appeals found that
this was a "trial tactic" and that a "trial right" was not implicated. See id.
172. Randolph, 24 Va. App. at 349, 482 S.E.2d at 103.
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hearsay rule.' The court of appeals found the statement to
be admissible as a declaration against interest of an un7 4 sidestepping any violation of the Conavailable declarant,'
5

frontation Clause.1

D. Right to Counsel
In Commonwealth v. Thornton,76 the defendant's apartment
was searched by the police in his absence. Prior to being
charged, the defendant consulted an attorney, who called the
police and stated that he wanted to be present for any interviews with the defendant.'77 A week later, however, the defendant contacted the police, said that he wanted to proceed without his attorney, and agreed to come to the police station. 8
The Virginia Court of Appeals held that because the defendant
was not in custody at the time, the purported assertion of the
defendant's right to counsel by his attorney was ineffectual. 9
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was also at issue in
Saleem v. Commonwealth." ° While Atif Saleem was in jail
prior to trial, Detective Anthony Spencer visited another inmate, Watkins, and told him to "keep his ears open. ""'
Spencer mentioned several specific cases including a robbery
173. See id. at 359, 482 S.E.2d at 107.
174. The court of appeals found that the Commonwealth did not have to establish
the unavailability of the declarant in a joint trial. See id. at 356, 482 S.E.2d at 106.
Where the declarant is not a co-defendant, however, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish unavailability. In McfDonnough v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App.
120, 486 S.E.2d 570 (1997), the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the Commonwealth must attempt to subpoena the declarant or provide reasonable explanation
why the subpoena was not issued. Testimony from officers concerning their attempts
to locate the declarant was held insufficient to show due diligence in locating declarant. See id. at 130-31, 486 S.E.2d at 575.
The court of appeals found the erroneous admission of the statement, which
was the only direct evidence of guilt, to be harmless error because the circumstantial
evidence was "overwhelming." See id. at 132, 486 S.E.2d at 575.
175. See Randolph, 24 Va. App. at 357, 482 S.E.2d at 107.
176. 24 Va. App. 478, 483 S.E.2d 487 (1997).
177. See id. at 483, 483 S.E.2d at 489.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 488, 483 S.E.2d at 492. Perhaps the attorney would have been wise
to alert his client that he wanted to be present at all interviews instead of notifying
only the police.
180. 23 Va. App. 726, 479 S.E.2d 549 (1997).
181. Id. at 731, 479 S.E.2d at 551.
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involving "Atif."5 2 Watkins agreed, and he testified that although Spencer did not promise him anything, he "hoped" his
cooperation would get some of his court costs paid." A few
days later, Watkins was transferred to the building he had
requested before Spencer's visit and was assigned to the
defendant's cellblock.1 When the defendant spontaneously began speaking about the case, Watkins questioned him to get
more details, which Watkins reported to Spencer."s The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because Watkins was not an
agent of the government, and received no inducement or instruction from Spencer as to how to gain information about the
offense."
E. Miscellaneous
The Virginia Court of Appeals used the First Amendment's
protection of the freedom of religion to strike down a provision
of the Wildlife Code criminalizing the possession of wild bird
feathers and parts, 8" and held that producing false DNA and
fingerprint reports during an interrogation did not render the
defendant's confession involuntary and inadmissible under the
Fifth Amendment."s Additionally, the Virginia Court of Appeals rejected a trial court's reliance on a scheduling order
showing that a defendant waived her right to trial where the
defendant requested a jury at arraignment and said she had

182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id
185. See id.
186. See id. at 733, 479 S.E.2d at 552. The fact that the detective had given the
informant a "target list" was not considered "instruction" by the court of appeals.
187. See Horen v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 735, 479 S.E.2d 553 (1997). The
court of appeals found that Virginia Code section 29.1-521(A)(10) was not religiously
neutral, burdened the free exercise of religion, and was neither supported by a compelling interest nor employed the least restrictive means to support a state interest.
Id. at 743-44, 479 S.E.2d at 557; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-521(AX1O) (Repl. Vol.
1997).
188. See Arthur v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 102, 480 S.E.2d 749 (1997). The
court of appeals noted that the officers did not emphasize the false reports, the defendant did not confess immediately upon seeing the reports, and the defendant confessed several times. See id. at 107-08, 480 S.E.2d at 752.
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not authorized her counsel to waive her right to a jury.'8 9 In a
case decided en banc, the Virginia Court of Appeals expanded
the courts' power to try a defendant in his absence by finding
that the Commonwealth is not required to offer any specific
reasons why it would be prejudiced by a delay. 9 '

IV.

TRIALS

A. Speedy Trial
Two decisions from the Supreme Court of Virginia dealt with
the statutory right of the defendant to a speedy trial. In Johnson v. Commonwealth,' the supreme court interpreted the
language of the statute concerning the pendency of appeals.'92
Johnson had been arrested and convicted in 1992."9 On appeal, the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed his conviction and
remanded the case for new trial in December 1993.19 In
March 1994, Johnson filed a motion to dismiss alleging that he
189. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 636, 484 S.E.2d 618 (1997).
190. See Cruz v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 454, 482 S.E.2d 880 (1997) (en
banc). In Cruz, the court of appeals held that the unexplained absence of the defendant at trial constitutes a voluntary waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to appear
if (1) the defendant had notice of the court date, and (2) he was warned that his
failure to appear could result in trial in his absence. See id. at 463, 482 S.E.2d at
884. The court of appeals found that the "Appearance at Trial" form signed by the
defendant was sufficient to establish both elements. See id.
The court of appeals declined to address whether signing a bond recognizance
form would be sufficient to show a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to be
present. Id. at 463-64 n.8, 482 S.E.2d at 885 n.8.
The court of appeals further held that although the trial court may proceed in
the defendant's absence only if there has been a voluntary waiver of his appearance
and the Commonwealth would be prejudiced by a continuance, prejudice can be
shown by something other than the unavailability of witnesses. See id. at 464, 482
S.E.2d at 885. The court of appeals found sufficient prejudice to the Commonwealth
where the Commonwealth offered no specific reasons it would be prejudiced, but instead relied on the general disruption to the proper administration of justice. See id.
at 467, 482 S.E.2d at 886. The court of appeals also found the trial court's finding of
prejudice supported by the fact that there were no assurances that the defendant
would be present if the trial was rescheduled. See id. at 466, 482 S.E.2d at 886.
191. 252 Va. 425, 478 S.E.2d 539 (1996).
192. The relevant language of Virginia Code section 19.2-243 provides: "But the
time during the pendency of any appeal in any appellate court shall not be included
as applying to the provisions of this section." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol.
1995).

193. See Johnson, 252 Va. at 427, 478 S.E.2d at 540.
194. See id.
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had been continuously in custody since January 1992, and that
the Commonwealth had failed to try him within five months,
minus the time during the pendency of his appeal.'95 The supreme court held that the speedy trial statute does not apply to
persons held for retrial after a successful appeal because the
statute requires only that trial "commence" within the statutory
period. 9 '
In Robbs v. Commonwealth,' decided the same day as
Johnson, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
defendant's release prior to trial extended the time within
which the Commonwealth was required to try him from five to
nine months." The defendant argued that the Commonwealth
failed to meet even the nine month time limitation.' The
Commonwealth contended that the twenty days that the trial
court took to decide the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress
should not be chargeable against the Commonwealth and,
therefore, the Commonwealth fulfilled the obligation of the
statute.2 00 The supreme court found from the record that

twenty days after the defendant's motion was filed, the trial
court heard oral argument and immediately ruled. °' The supreme court held that because the trial date had not yet been
fixed, the filing of the motion did not cause the case to be continued or otherwise delayed and, thus, the Commonwealth did

195. See id
196. See id. at 429, 478 S.E.2d at 541. According to the supreme court, Johnson's
trial began in 1992 and just had not reached "final judgment" yet. See id. In the
second issue decided by the supreme court, Johnson argued that panels of the court
of appeals are not bound by the rule of stare decisis in following the decisions of
other panels of the court. Johnson relied upon the statutory language of Virginia
Code sections 17-116.02(C) and 17-11602(D)(ii) concerning the independence of panels
of the court of appeals and the role of the en banc court. The supreme court affirmed
its interpretation of the law in Commonwealth v. Burns, 240 Va. 171, 395 S.E.2d 456
(1990), holding that the rule of stare decisis applies to decisions of panels of the
court of appeals. See Johnson, 252 Va. at 430, 478 S.E.2d at 541.
197. 252 Va. 433, 478 S.E.2d 699 (1996).
198. See id. at 436, 478 S.E.2d at 700. The Commonwealth apparently realized
that the defendant's trial date was beyond the five-month limitation and moved to
have him released on a personal recognizance bond before the five-month period ended. See id.
199. See id
200. See id.
201. See id
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not carry its burden of showing that the defendant's motion
caused the delay. 2
The Virginia Court of Appeals addressed the right of a defendant to a speedy trial under Virginia Code section 19.2-243 in
two cases with seemingly conflicting controlling principles. One
case involved the duty of the defendant to notify the Commonwealth that he was ready for trial, while the other case involved the obligation of the trial court to control its docket and
schedule criminal cases.
In Jefferson v. Commonwealth, °3 the defendant appealed a
pre-trial ruling of the trial court concerning double jeopardy.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a continuance, supported by the Commonwealth, and entered a continuance order which stated "this case is continued from July 9,
1992 generally because defendant is appealing the court's ruling
on his double jeopardy motion.""' The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled on interlocutory appeal that such appeals of double
jeopardy claims were prohibited, and dismissed the appeal on
May 9, 1995.05 On October 27, 1995, the defendant filed a

motion to dismiss, alleging that his right to a speedy trial had
been violated.2"
The Virginia Court of Appeals acknowledged that the wording
of the order suggested "that defense counsel and the prosecutor
may have had an understanding as to the length of the continuance," but held that the additional words "continued ... generally" meant the continuance was for an indefinite period of
time."7 The court of appeals further stated that when the defendant is granted an indefinite continuance, "the speedy trial
period will not recommence until the defendant announces...
that he [is] ready for trial."0 8 The court of appeals reasoned
that the Commonwealth should not be held responsible for
keeping up with the case as it progressed through the appellate
courts.' Writing in dissent, Judge Benton noted that the tri202. See id
203. 23 Va. App. 652, 479 S.E.2d 80 (1996).
204. Id. at 655, 479 S.E.2d at 81.

205. See id206. See id at, 656, 479 S.E.2d at 81.
207. Id at 656-57, 479 S.E.2d at 82.
208. Id. at 657, 479 S.E.2d at 82.
209. See idi The court of appeals stated that the record did not "indicate that the
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al court had received the mandate of the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissing the appeal on June 1, 1995, ending the
appeal.21 After the mandate was returned, the defendant's
appeal of the double jeopardy ruling was not the cause for
delay; therefore, the time after June 1, 1995, was charged to
the Commonwealth.21 '
In Baker v. Commonwealth,2 2 the Commonwealth requested
a continuance and the defendant objected. After the trial court
granted the continuance, defendant's counsel suggested a date
for trial, which he knew was beyond the statutory five month
speedy trial period."'3 The Virginia Court of Appeals held that
the suggestion of a trial date beyond the five month period was
not a waiver of speedy trial rights and did not constitute a
concurrence in the Commonwealth's request for a continuance. 4 The court of appeals reaffirmed that "[ilt is the responsibility of the trial court... to control the court's docket
and schedule criminal cases for trial""' and that the trial
court should "indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver."15 If the court of appeals had employed similar guiding principles in Jefferson, the result might have been different
in that matter.

Commonwealth was informed that the defendant had ended his appeal in the state
courts nor that the defendant was forgoing [sic] any appeal in the federal court system." Id. at 659, 479 S.E.2d at 83. The court of appeals also considered this factor in
deciding that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial had not been
violated. See id.
As noted by the dissent, the court of appeals received the mandate from the
Supreme Court of Virginia on June 1, 1995, which returned the case to the trial
court's jurisdiction. The court of appeals and either the Commonwealth's Attorney or
the Attorney General (whomever was counsel of record for the Commonwealth of Virginia in the appeal) was notified by the mandate that the defendant had ended his
appeal in state courts. Also, had the defendant elected to pursue a petition for a writ
of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, counsel for the Commonwealth
would have received notice of such an action.
210. See id. at 660, 479 S.E.2d at 84 (Benton, J., dissenting).
211. See id at 660-61, 479 S.E.2d at 84 (Benton, J., dissenting).
212. 25 Va. App. 19, 486 S.E.2d 111 (1997).
213. See id. at 21, 486 S.E.2d at 112.
214. See id at 24-25, 486 S.E.2d at 114.
215. Id. at 24, 486 S.E.2d at 113 (citing Baity v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 497,
431 S.E.2d 891 (1993)); see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 566, 347
S.E.2d 146 (1986).
216. Id. at 25, 486 S.E.2d at 114.
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B. Continuances
The failure to grant a continuance was held to be error in
two cases decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals this year. In
Mills v. Commonwealth,217 the court of appeals found an
abuse of discretion where a defense attorney was unprepared
for trial, had not conducted an adequate investigation, and
generally had not responded to or communicated with his client.21 In Crawford v. Commonwealth,219 the trial court denied a request for a continuance after the Commonwealth
amended the indictments following its case-in-chief to allege
new offenses with a different time frame." The Virginia
Court of Appeals held that the language of Virginia Code section 19.2-231 is mandatory and the trial court must grant a
continuance if the amendments were a surprise to the defendant." I Since the defendant adequately demonstrated surprise
to the trial court by showing that a new defense would have
included a different alibi and other exculpatory evidence for the
new year alleged, and no contrary evidence supported the trial

217. 24 Va. App. 95, 480 S.E.2d 746 (1997).
218. See id at 97, 480 S.E.2d at 747. The record reflected particularly egregious
conduct by the attorney in this case. The attorney failed to contact or subpoena several material witnesses and the defendant could not get the attorney to return his
telephone calls. The defendant even took the step of writing to the trial court asking
for assistance in getting the subpoenas issued. See id.
219. 23 Va. App. 661, 479 S.E.2d 84 (1996) (en banc).
220. See id. at 664-65, 479 S.E.2d at 86. The Commonwealth indicted the defendant for having sex with a child under thirteen years of age, in violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-61, and sodomy with a child under thirteen years of age, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-67.1. On the stand, the victim could not remember
if the events happened when she was thirteen or fourteen. At the conclusion of the
Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the defendant moved to strike the evidence for failure
to establish the crimes charged. Over the defendants objections, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to amend the charges to carnal knowledge of a child between thirteen and fourteen years old, a violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-63,
and crimes against nature, a violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-361. See id.
The court of appeals noted that the Commonwealth was allowed to amend the
indictment under Virginia Code section 19.2-231, which allows indictments to be
amended at any time before a jury returns a verdict, provided the amendment does
not change the nature or character of the offense charged. See id.
221. See id at 666-67, 479 S.E.2d at 86-87. Virginia Code section 19.2-231 provides
in part: "[B]ut if the court finds that such amendment operates as a surprise to the
accused, he shall be entitled, upon request, to a continuance of the case for a reasonable time." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-231 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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court's finding of lack of surprise, the court of appeals reversed
the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.'
C. Jury Issues
1. Batson v. Kentucky'
In the only case considering a Batson challenge, the Virginia
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's ruling that disallowed a peremptory strike of a white juror after the defendant
offered a race-neutral explanation was clearly erroneous.'
Although the trial court's error was of statutory, not constitutional, dimension, the majority of the court of appeals found the
error harmful because the defendant was denied a fair trial by
a "lawful and properly constituted jury."2 2
2. Voir Dire
In Skipper v. Commonwealth,"5 the Virginia Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court's limitation on voir dire

222. See Crawford, 23 Va. App. at 667, 479 S.E.2d at 87.
223. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
224. See Cudjoe v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 193, 475 S.E.2d 821 (1996).
225. Id. at 205, 475 S.E.2d at 827. Writing in dissent, Judge Annunziata found the
error harmless because the juror could not have been removed for cause; therefore,
the defendant was tried by an impartial jury. Judge Annunziata also opined that the
error was harmless because the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant. See
id. at 207-08, 475 S.E.2d at 827-28 (Annunziata, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 12, 486 S.E.2d 108 (1997), the Virginia Court of Appeals assessed the potential error in refusing to grant a mistrial using
the harmless error principles of the dissent in Cudjoe. In Taylor, a juror delayed
response to a voir dire question until after opening argument, prompting the defendant to request a mistrial. The jurors had been asked "Have any of you ever been
the victim or have any members of your immediate family ever been the victim of a
violent crime?" Id. at 15, 486 S.E.2d at 109. After opening arguments, a juror stated
that her husband had been robbed at gunpoint earlier that year. The juror said she
had simply forgotten to mention it and did not think it would affect her verdict. See
id. The defendant conceded the juror could not be struck for cause, but said he would
have removed her from the panel with a peremptory strike. See id. at 16, 486 S.E.2d
at 110. The court of appeals held that because the juror could not be struck for
cause, the defendant was tried by an impartial jury, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. See id. at 18, 486 S.E.2d at 111.
226. 23 Va. App. 420, 477 S.E.2d 754 (1996).
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was an improper restriction on the defendant's right to utilize
his peremptory strikes in a race-neutral and gender-neutral
manner in violation of J.E.B. v. Alabama.227 The court of appeals found that J.E.B. had not mandated expanded voir dire,
and reaffirmed the trial court's discretion to limit voir dire.'
"A trial court's decision regarding the scope of voir dire... will
be upheld on appeal '[w]here [the trial court] affords ample opportunity to counsel to ask relevant questions and where the
questions [it] actually propound[s] ... [are] sufficient to pre-

serve a defendant's right to trial by a fair and impartial jury.-'
The trial court refused to allow two questions proposed
by the defendant,' 0 and the court of appeals adopted the reasoning of the trial court finding one question too ambiguous
and the other insufficient to uncover bias or prejudice of the jurors." 1 The court of appeals concluded that because the defendant received a fair trial by an impartial jury, the trial court
did not err in limiting the scope of voir dire."2
In a case from Virginia Beach, the Virginia Court of Appeals
unanimously agreed that the trial court's refusal to permit
counsel to participate in voir dire, as provided in Virginia Code
section 8.01-358, was error, but the panel could not agree as to
the proper resolution regarding the error.' After being informed by the Commonwealth's Attorney that the local practice
was for the trial court to conduct voir dire, defense counsel
asked to conduct his own voir dire, as provided in Virginia
The trial court refused, stating
Code section 8.01-358.'
"[tlhat's what I've always done, and that's what I'm going to
do."' The majority opinion, while deeply critical of the trial

227. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
228. See Skipper, 23 Va. App. at 426, 477 S.E.2d at 757.
229. Id. at 427, 477 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va.
389, 401, 384 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1989)).

230. The defendant proposed the following questions:
(1) Can anyone imagine why a not-guilty person would not testify?
(2) Who has children? For those with children, have you ever caught them in a

lie to excuse what they were not permitted to do?
Id. at 424, 477 S.E.2d at 756.
231. See iL at 429, 477 S.E.2d at 758-59.
232. See id. at 429-30, 477 S.E.2d at 759.
233. See Charity v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 258, 482 S.E.2d 59 (1997).
234. See id. at 270, 482 S.E.2d at 65 App. .
235. Id. at 271, 482 S.E.2d at 65 App. .
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court for refusing to follow the statutory mandate, found the
non-constitutional error to be harmless because the defendant
had received a fair trial by an impartial jury." s Judge Elder,
writing in dissent, found the case to defy harmless error analysis because the record "could never demonstrate juror bias or
prejudice affect[ed] the trial's outcome. " " Judge Elder also
cautioned that affirmance would "send a signal that the judges
of an entire judicial circuit may ignore the mandate of a statute
with impunity and without concern for reversal upon appellate
review. " '
3. Miscellaneous
In cases of first impression, the Virginia Court of Appeals
permitted jurors to ask questions of witnesses,'
and held
that consent to an eleven-member jury panel after one member
has been excused mid-trial is a waiver of a right to a jury trial
and must be the product of voluntary, knowing and intelligently
given consent." The court of appeals also held that Virginia
Code section 19.2-262(4), concerning the procedure for making
peremptory strikes when defendants elect to be tried jointly,
does not apply to defendants involuntarily joined; therefore,
involuntarily joined defendants are not entitled to additional pe-

236. See id. at 266, 482 S.E.2d at 63. The majority noted that defense counsel had
been given the opportunity to supplement the voir dire with written questions, but
declined to do so. See id.
237. Id. at 269, 482 S.E.2d at 64 (Elder, J., dissenting). "At the heart of an
attorney's right to voir dire . . . [is the] desire to engage in one-on-one interaction..
. . These unquantifiable and indeterminate variables will rarely, if ever, be revealed
in the record." Id. at 269-70, 482 S.E.2d at 64 (Elder, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 268, 482 S.E.2d at 64 (Elder, J., dissenting).
239. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 577, 484 S.E.2d 153 (1997). The
court of appeals cautioned trial courts to adopt procedures that assure control over
the process and avoid the pitfalls that have the potential for prejudice. See id. at
582, 484 S.E.2d at 155-56. Although the court of appeals did not delineate the proper
procedures, in reviewing cases from other jurisdictions the court of appeals included
several procedures designed to avoid prejudice, such as having the question submitted
in writing and allowing counsel to review the question and object outside of the presence of the jury. See id.
240. See Moffett v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 387, 482 S.E.2d 846 (1997). The
court of appeals also required both the trial court and the Commonwealth's Attorney
to agree to the waiver and have the waiver obtained and entered of record. See id. at
392-93, 482 S.E.2d at 849.
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remptory challenges."' The court of appeals also reversed a
defendant's conviction because the trial court stated, in a juror's
presence, that the defendant was challenging him for cause. 2
D. Evidentiary Issues
1. Expert Testimony
In Zelenak v. Commonwealth,' the en banc Virginia Court
of Appeals vacated the judgment of the panel and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court excluding expert testimony in support of the defense that the defendant participated in the
crimes out of fear that her co-defendant would kill her or a
member of her family.' The defendant sought to introduce
testimony of a licensed clinical social worker that the defendant
suffered from multiple personality disorder, a dissociative disorder that resulted from traumatic stress, which made her
"susceptible to duress. " "5 Defense counsel was allowed to proffer the excluded testimony and stated that the expert would
testify that the defendant "was in such a fear of Mr.
Morehead... [that] she was afraid that if she didn't go along
with what he was saying that she was going to be harmed. " '
Defense counsel further proffered that the expert would testify
that it was her opinion that the defendant "got to the point

241. See Adkins v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 159, 480 S.E.2d 777 (1997).
242. See Brooks v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 523, 484 S.E.2d 127 (1997). The
court of appeals held that the exchange in front of the jury, which also included the
prosecutor's assertion that he found the juror fair and impartial, tainted the impartiality of the juror. See id. at 530-31, 484 S.E.2d at 130-32. Although the juror was
struck by the Commonwealth during peremptories, the error was not harmless because the defendant was entitled to a jury panel free from exception. See id.
The second issue addressed by the court of appeals was the trial court's procedure of deferring argument on juror issues until after the jury was sworn and seated.
The trial court immediately ruled on the defendant's motion to strike, but refused to
hear argument on the issue until after the jury was sworn. The court of appeals
condemned this procedure for giving "the appearance to the defendant and the public
that the court is unwilling to timely hear or consider the grounds for a party's motion" and for necessitating a mistrial if the court is persuaded by argument. I&. at
531-32, 484 S.E.2d at 131-32. Because the court reversed on other grounds, the prejudice from the procedure was not addressed. See id
243. 25 Va. App. 295, 487 S.E.2d 873 (1997).
244. See id. at 305-06, 487 S.E.2d at 878.
245. Id. at 298, 487 S.E.2d at 874.
246. Id.
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where she believed that escape from him or disobedience would
result in her death or the death of a family member." 7
The court of appeals held that the proffered testimony expressed an opinion on an ultimate issue-whether the defendant acted under duress-and was properly excluded.' Judge
Benton and Judge Elder, dissenting, found that the testimony
did not express an opinion as to the ultimate issue-whether
the defendant acted under duress on the day in question" 9and that the trial court erred in not admitting the relevant and
probative portions of the expert's testimony' 0 The majority
took issue with the dissent's suggestion that the trial court had
a duty to "cull the 'relevant and probative portions' of the proffer and admit only that testimony." '
2. Rape Complaints
In two cases the Virginia Court of Appeals dealt with the
issue of admissibility of rape complaints, changing the "recent
complaint" rule, codified in Virginia Code section 19.2-268.2, 2
to the "not so recent description of events" rule. In Terry v.
Commonwealth, 3 the court of appeals held that a report
made ten months after the incident was "recent" within the
meaning of the statute because the complaint need only have
been made "without delay which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense."' Because the complainant offered explanations for the delay which the trial court
found consistent with the nature and circumstances surround-

247. Id. at 300, 487 S.E.2d at 875.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 304, 487 S.E.2d at 877 (Benton, J., dissenting).
250. See id. at 305, 487 S.E.2d at 878 (Benton, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 300 n.1, 487 S.E.2d at 876 n.1. The court of appeals did not clarify
why the trial courtes duty to distinguish relevant and admissible evidence should be
obviated.
252. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (the "fact that the person injured made complaint of the offense recently after commission of the offense" is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule).
253. 24 Va. App. 627, 484 S.E.2d 614 (1997).
254. Id. at 634, 484 S.E.2d at 617 (quoting Woodard v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.
App. 24, 27, 448 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994) (emphasis in original)).
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ing the offense,2 5 the court of appeals held that the rape complaint was admissible to corroborate the victim's testimony. 56
In Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 the extent of the testimony
concerning the complaint was at issue, not the timeliness of the
complaint. The defendant was charged with proposing an act of
sodomy to a minor." In the Commonwealth's case-in-chief,
the complainant testified that the defendant said "Let me suck
you," and his mother and brother testified that the complainant
reported to them that he had been sexually solicited. 9 The
defendant testified that he had been misquoted, and had said
instead: "All you do is come around trying to suck up to me for
more money."' On rebuttal, the Commonwealth recalled the
complainant's brother. 2" Over the defendant's objection, the
trial court ruled the brother's testimony was admissible as a
"report of the victim's prior consistent statement." 2 The
brother testified as to what the complainant told him happened
between himself and the defendant, including surrounding circumstances.'
The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the testimony was
not admissible as a prior consistent statement because none of
the circumstances justifying admission of a prior consistent
statement were present." The court of appeals held, however,
255. The complainant testified she did not tell her mother because she was "afraid
her mother would not believe her because the defendant was her mother's good
friend. She did not tell her father for fear her father would hurt the defendant and
end up in jail. She testified she felt responsible for the rape because she insisted on
staying home [that night]." Id. at 636, 484 S.E.2d at 618.
256. See i&
257. 25 Va. App. 81, 486 S.E.2d 551 (1997).
258. See id. at 83, 486 S.E.2d at 552.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See iaL
262. Id.
263. See id. at 84, 486 S.E.2d at 552.
264. See id. The court of appeals noted that prior consistent statements are admissible when the opposing party:
(1) suggests that the declarant had a motive to falsify his testimony and
the consistent statement was made prior to the existence of that motive,
(2) alleges that the declarant, due to his relationship to the matter or to
an involved party, had a design to misrepresent his testimony and the
prior consistent statement was made before the existence of that relationship, (3) alleges that the declarant's testimony is a fabrication of recent
date and the prior consistent statement was made at a time when its

1050

UNiVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1015

that the testimony was admissible as a report of a recent complaint of sexual assault under Virginia Code section 19.2268.2.' Recognizing that only the fact of complaint and not
the details of the complaint were admissible under the "recent
complaint" exception, the court of appeals found that the testimony of the brother was not outside the scope of the exception.2' The court of appeals found that

[i]t is consistent with human experience that [a child] will
lodge his complaint in the form of a description of the
event, and in that description lies his complaint of the offense ....

The details of the victim's complaint were ele-

ments of the offense. Without those details, the complaint
would have been incomplete.' 7
3. Other Hearsay Exceptions
The Virginia Court of Appeals recently decided three cases
concerning other exceptions to the hearsay rule, rendering several exceptions very broad and barring the availability of another exception. In Sparks v. Commonwealth,2 8 the court of appeals gutted the "custodian" prong of the business records exception, allowing a vice president of corporate security at a
bank to authenticate bank records even though the vice president was neither the custodian of the records nor the supervisor to the custodian of the records.269 In Anderson v. Common-

ultimate effect could not have been be foreseen, or (4) impeaches the
declarant with a prior inconsistent statement.
Id. at 84-85, 486 S.E.2d at 552-53 (citation omitted).
The defense at trial was simply that the defendant's statement had been misrepresented. The defendant did not allege that the complainant had a motive to lie or
a design to misrepresent his testimony, nor did he accuse the witness of recent fabrication. See id.
265. See id. at 85, 486 S.E.2d at 553.
266. See id. at 86, 486 S.E.2d at 553.
267. Id. at 86, 486 S.E.2d at 553. Apparently, the fact that the brother had previously testified in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief as to the fact of the complaint,
and was able at that time to distinguish the complaint from the details of the offense
did not concern the court. Nor did the fact that much of the brother's testimony
concerning the circumstances surrounding the incident were not probative of elements
of the offense.
268. 24 Va. App. 279, 482 S.E.2d 69 (1997).
269. See id. at 281-84, 482 S.E.2d at 70-71.
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wealth,"7 the court of appeals held that a certificate of analysis concerning a breath test is admissible under Virginia Code
section 18.2-268.9 as an exception to the rule against hearsay
even if the person attesting to the certificate has no personal
knowledge of facts contained therein.27 ' In Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 the en banc court of appeals held that the curative
admissibility doctrine is unavailable if the party did not object
to the inadmissible evidence to gain admission of other inadmissible evidence.273
4. Miscellaneous
The Virginia Court of Appeals recently held that the filing
requirements of Virginia Code section 19.2-187 do not apply to
the admission of a certificate of analysis under Virginia Code
section 19.2-187.01 for proving chain of custody of evidence
within a laboratory. 4 Similarly, in Cregger v. Commonwealth,"5 the Virginia Court of Appeals held that section 19.2187 does not require the Commonwealth to deliver a copy of
the certificate of analysis in a de novo proceeding in circuit
court even though the defendant requested the certificate while
the case was pending in general district court.276 The court of
appeals held that the de novo proceeding starts the case anew,
and that the defense attorney must make the
request incidental
2 77
to the de novo proceedings in circuit court.

270. 25 Va. App. 26, 486 S.E.2d 115 (1997).
271. See id. at 31, 486 S.E.2d at 117. The officer who conducted the test and attested the certificate had no knowledge concerning the date the machine was last
tested for accuracy and did not know whether the machine had been found to be
accurate. See id at 28-29, 34, 35, 486 S.E.2d at 116, 118-19; see also VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-268.9 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
272. 23 Va. App. 1, 473 S.E.2d 707 (1996) (en banc).
273. See id. at 9, 473 S.E.2d at 711.
274. See Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 768, 776-78, 485 S.E.2d 646, 65051 (1997).

275. 25 Va. App. 87, 486 S.E.2d 554 (1997).
276. See id. at 91, 486 S.E.2d at 556.
277. See id. The dissent pointed out that this logic would also necessitate the
Commonwealth making a second delivery of the certificate if the defendant requests
the certificate in general district as well as in circuit court. See id. at 93, 486 S.E.2d
at 557 (Elder, J., dissenting).
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5. What Were They Thinking?
Several cases decided during the past year involved courtroom conduct that was questionable, improper, or just unwise.
In Rosser v. Commonwealth,278 the prosecutor called the defendant "an animal" in closing argument."' The trial court sustained the defendant's objection and overruled the motion for a
mistrialY ° The court of appeals found, however, that even
clear direction to the jury to disregard the statements of the
prosecutor would be insufficient, and remanded the case to
"cure the inappropriate conduct of the prosecutor."
In Mills v. Commonwealth, 2 the arresting officer, in a case
involving driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, not
only stated on cross-examination that the defendant had needle
marks on his arms, but also proffered a photograph of the
marks.' Although the trial court in this case properly admonished the jury to ignore the remark, the improper evidence
was so prejudicial that the Virginia Court of Appeals ordered a
mistrial.'
The zealousness of the prosecutor apparently knew no bounds
in Pease v. Commonwealth.' Virginia Code section 19.2-201
provides that "no attorney for the Commonwealth shall go before any grand jury except when duly sworn to testify as a
witness, but he may advise the foreman of a regular grand jury
or any member or members thereof in relation to the discharge
of their duties."' Despite this statute, the prosecutor contacted the grand jury about a witness, informed them that he
thought the witness would testify untruthfully, examined the
witness for the grand jury, and had an officer present to witness her testimony so that he might impeach the witness later

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

24 Va. App. 308, 482 S.E.2d 83 (1997).
See id. at 310, 482 S.E.2d at 84.
See id. at 312-14, 482 S.E.2d at 85-86.
See id. at 315, 482 S.E.2d at 87.
24 Va. App. 415, 482 S.E.2d 860 (1997).
See id. at 419, 482 S.E.2d at 862.
See id. at 421, 482 S.E.2d at 863.
24 Va. App. 397, 482 S.E.2d 851 (1997).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-201 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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with her statement. 7 The Virginia Court of Appeals found
that this behavior "well surpasses that which the Code permits"
and quashed the indictment because there was "no other conclusion but that [the prosecutor] substantially influenced the
grand jury in reaching an indictment."'
In Thomas v. Commonwealth, 9 the defense counsel filed
two contradictory notices of alibi and the defendant testified as
to a third alibi at trial.2" The Virginia Court of Appeals held
that the Notices of Alibi, although signed only by defense counsel and not the defendant himself, could be used to impeach the
defendant at trialY
In Hoverter v. Commonwealth, 2 the defendant alleged that
Commonwealth represented to him that if he did not plead
guilty to first degree murder and abduction, the Commonwealth
would prosecute him for sodomy." s After the defendant entered an Alford plea,' the press reported that the prosecutor
said he had never intended to charge sodomy because he lacked
sufficient evidence to prove the chargeY 5 Later, the prosecutor testified that he "may have misspoken" at the press conference, but that he fully intended to charge sodomy in absence of
the plea agreement.' The trial court's refusal to allow the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea was affirmed."

287. See Pease, 24 Va. App. at 399-400, 482 S.E.2d at 852.
288. Id. at 400, 482 S.E.2d at 852.
289. 24 Va. App. 614, 484 S.E.2d 607 (1997).
290. See id. at 615, 484 S.E.2d at 608. The first Notice of Alibi stated that the
defendant intended to offer evidence that he was at his sister's residence in Falls
Church. The Amended Notice of Alibi stated that the defendant would assert an alibi
that he telephoned his sister from a public phone in Falls Church and that she
picked him up and took him to Washington, D.C. where he took a train to New
York. At trial the defendant said he was in New York all day. See id.
291. See id. at 616-17, 484 S.E.2d at 608-09.
292. 23 Va. App. 454, 477 S.E.2d 771 (1996).
293. See id. at 463, 477 S.E.2d at 775.
294. An Alford plea is made pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970), where the United States Supreme Court held that a "guilty plea" is not required if the plea is a voluntary and intelligent choice of the alternatives available to
the defendant. See id. at 31.
295. See Hoverter, 23 Va. App. at 463, 477 S.E.2d at 775.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 465, 477 S.E.2d at 776.
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E. Instructions
In Mosby v. Commonwealth,"5 the Virginia Court of Appeals considered instructions given in a prosecution under the
child endangerment statute9 9 and found that two of the
instructions given by the trial court improperly allowed the jury
to find criminal liability based upon a finding of simple
negligence."s° The instructions were not harmless error because the court of appeals was unable to find that the invitation to
convict solely on simple negligence influenced the ver30 1
dict.
In Turner v. Commonwealth,"2 the jury was instructed on
first and second degree murder, but not voluntary manslaughter as the defendant had requested.0 ' The Virginia Court of
Appeals held that the denial was error, but the majority determined that the error was harmless."' In finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder rather than acquitting
him, the jury found that the defendant acted with malice.0 5
"Homicide committed pursuant to a preconceived plan is not
voluntary manslaughter; premeditation and reasonable provocation cannot co-exist."3 o According to the majority, the verdict demonstrated that the jury necessarily excluded an alterna-

298. 23 Va. App. 53, 473 S.E.2d 732 (1996).
299. See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-103 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
300. See Mosby, 23 Va. App. at 59, 473 S.E.2d at 735. The court of appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the defendant because she had been
charged and convicted of placing her child in an actual condition of endangerment,
the clause of Virginia Code section 40.1-103 that was excepted from the holding in
Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 Va. App. 150, 462 S.E.2d 582 (1995), which found the
second clause of the statute concerning possibility of endangerment to be unconstitutionally vague and inclusive. See id. at 155, 462 S.E.2d at 585.
301. See Mosby, 23 Va. App. at 59, 473 S.E.2d at 735.
302. 23 Va. App. 270, 476 S.E.2d 504 (1996). The opinions in this case are interesting for the "battle of authority from other jurisdictions" over the harmlessness of
refusing jury instructions that the majority and dissent used. Compare id. at 277-78
n.2, 476 S.E.2d at 509 n.2, with id. at 281-85, 476 S.E.2d at 510-11 (Benton, J.,
dissenting).
303. See id. at 274, 476 S.E.2d at 506.
304. See id. at 275, 278, 476 S.E.2d at 507-08.
305. See id. at 277, 476 S.E.2d at 508.
306. Id. (citing Read v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 924, 938 (1872)).
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rive resolution of fact that would have supported the lesserincluded offense
of voluntary manslaughter; therefore the error
3 7
harmless.
was
Writing in dissent, Judge Benton argued that the evidence of
malice had been disputed at trial and the jury had "sufficient
evidence from which it could have found, if properly instructed,
a non-malicious killing." 8 The fact that the jury selected culpability from one of the malicious homicides "did not manifest
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would not have found
a non-malicious killing if properly instructed.3 9
In Brown v. Commonwealth,31 the defendant requested an
instruction on attempted robbery. The defendant had approached the victim, displayed a firearm and said "give me your
money.""' The victim said, "You've got the wrong guy," and
the defendant responded, "Give me your wallet."1 The victim
handed his wallet to the defendant who opened it, and seeing
no money, threw it to the ground as he walked away. 3 ' The
Virginia Court of Appeals held that the denial of an instruction
on attempted robbery was not error because the crime was
completed when the defendant took the victim's wallet with the
intent to permanently deprive him of his money."1 4 The dissent argued that the attempted robbery instruction should have
been given and that the majority mistakenly failed to focus on
the defendant's intent. 5 The dissent proposed that the proper
question was whether the defendant could have taken the wallet merely to search it for money and not with the intent to
steal money.1 6 The dissent further argued that because the
defendant possibly took the wallet only to look for money, the
jury should
have been instructed on the offense of attempted
31 7
robbery.

307. See id. at 277-78, 476 S.E.2d at 508.
308. Id. at 279, 476 S.E.2d at 509 (Benton, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 281, 476 S.E.2d at 510 (Benton, J., dissenting).
310. 24 Va. App. 292, 482 S.E.2d 75 (1997) (en banc).
311. Id. at 294, 482 S.E.2d at 76-77.
312. Id at 294-95, 482 S.E.2d at 77.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 295, 482 S.E.2d at 77.
315. See id. at 296, 482 S.E.2d at 77-78 (Moon, J., dissenting).
316. See id. at 297, 482 S.E.2d at 77-78 (Moon, J., dissenting).
317. See id.
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JUVENILE JUSTICE

With recent changes to the Virginia Code affected in order to
"get tough" on juvenile crime, the distinctions between juvenile
justice and general criminal procedure have diminished. The
Virginia Court of Appeals published few opinions this past year
dealing exclusively with issues of juvenile justice; the decisions
reflect the change in treatment of juvenile offenders. In
Broadnax v. Commonwealth,18 the Virginia Court of Appeals
interpreted the effect of the July 1, 1994 amendment to
Virginia Code section 16.1-271, holding that the plain language
of the statute divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction over a
juvenile once he has been tried or treated as an adult; the
juvenile need not be convicted as an adult to divest the juvenile
court of jurisdiction. 19
In Dodson v. Commonwealth,"2 the defendant argued that
because Virginia Code section 18.2-308.2, prohibiting possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, had not yet been passed at
the time of his prior felony conviction, the statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. 2 ' The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the prohibition in Virginia Code section 18.2308.2 was not an ex post facto violation." 2 The court of ap-

318. 24 Va. App. 808, 485 S.E.2d 666 (1997).
319. See id. at 815, 485 S.E.2d at 669. The relevant language of Virginia Code
section 16.1-271 provides:
The trial or treatment of a juvenile as an adult pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall preclude the juvenile court from taking jurisdiction of such juvenile for subsequent offenses committed by that juvenile.
Any juvenile who is tried and convicted in a circuit court as an adult
under the provisions of this article shall be considered and treated as an
adult in any criminal proceeding resulting from any alleged future criminal acts and any disposed of by the juvenile court at the time of the
criminal conviction.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
In Broadnax, the court of appeals held that the first two provisions of the statute were not contradictory because the first paragraph specifically referred to subsequent offenses and the second paragraph concerns the effects of a juvenile's conviction
in circuit court as an adult with respect to any charges pending in juvenile court at
the time of conviction, regardless of when they were committed. See Broadnax, 24 Va.
App. at 815, 485 S.E.2d at 669.
320. 23 Va. App. 286, 476 S.E.2d 512 (1996).
321. See id. at 294-95, 476 S.E.2d at 516.
322. See id. at 295, 476 S.E.2d at 516.
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peals also held that the protections of former Virginia Code
section 16.1-179, in effect at the time of the defendant's previous conviction, did not apply to juveniles, such as the defendant, who had been tried as adults."s
In Wilson v. Commonwealth," the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the circuit courts have inherent power to punish
juveniles who violate their orders and that no guardian ad
litem need be appointed where the juvenile's counsel adequately
represents the juvenile's interests.3"
VI. CRIMES
A. Traffic Offenses
1. Cruising and Boozing
The Virginia Court of Appeals considered the statutory language of Virginia Code section 18.2-266 in two cases, holding
that the term "operate" did not limit prosecutions to situations
where the ignition switch of a car was in the "on" position,"M
and that the statutory provision "operated on the public highways" was a limitation applicable only to the operation of a
moped."a
In two en banc decisions, the Virginia Court of Appeals interpreted the language of Virginia Code section 18.2-266.1 in a
manner that makes defending minors in drinking and driving
M the court of
cases very difficult. In Mejia v. Commonwealth,"
323. See id. at 297-98, 476 S.E.2d at 517-18.
324. 23 Va. App. 318, 477 S.E.2d 7 (1996).
325. See id. at 323-25, 477 S.E.2d at 9-10. The court of appeals declined to declare
void the trial courtes sentencing order, which used the term "jail" in violation of Virginia Code section 16.1-292(A), which requires confinement of juveniles in "secure
facilities for juveniles rather than in jail." VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-292(A) (Repl. Vol.
1996 & Cum. Supp. 1997). The court of appeals assumed that the trial judge had
knowledge of Virginia Code section 16.2-292, and construed the term "jail" as complying with the law and meaning "appropriate location for juvenile confinement." Wilson,
23 Va. App. at 326, 477 S.E.2d at 10.
326. See Propst v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 791, 793, 485 S.E.2d 657, 658-59
(1997).
327. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 351, 352-53, 477 S.E.2d 301, 302
(1996).
328. 23 Va. App. 173, 474 S.E.2d 866 (1996) (en banc).
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appeals held that "illegal" consumption of alcohol is an element
of the offense of driving under the influence while a minor, but
the Commonwealth may establish a prima facie case bf illegality by proof that a person under the age of twenty-one has operated a motor vehicle while having the requisite breath alcohol
level."2 Once a prima facie case is shown, the defendant bears
the burden of introducing evidence to raise a reasonable doubt
regarding the illegality of the alcohol consumption.' 0 In
Charles v. Commonwealth,3 ' the defendant wanted to introduce evidence explaining his performance on the field sobriety
tests to rebut the presumption that the breath alcohol concentration measurement accurately reflected his blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving. 2 The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the field test performance was irrelevant and
inadmissible because it constituted "evidence tending to prove
that the defendant was not under the influence."'
2. Habitual Driving
In three cases, the Virginia Court of Appeals interpreted the
statutory language of Virginia Code section 46.2-357 which
prohibits habitual offenders from driving motor vehicles on
highways during the pendency of revocation of their driving
privileges. 3" In Long v. Commonwealth,3 35 the court of appeals held that the legislature had abrogated the common law
defense of necessity in habitual offender cases. The court of appeals reasoned that consideration of the factual circumstances
necessary to the defense are relegated by statute to the punish-

329. See id. at 176-78, 474 S.E.2d at 867-68.
330. See id. The court of appeals reached this conclusion by construing the term
"any such person" in the second sentence of the statute to mean "any person under
the age of twenty-one." The court of appeals further construed the first sentence to
establish the offense and the second sentence to establish how the Commonwealth
proves a prima facie case. See id. at 177, 474 S.E.2d at 868. Although this rationale
suggests contorted logic, this standard lessens the burden upon the Commonwealth in
convicting minors for these offenses.
331. 23 Va. App. 161, 474 S.E.2d 860 (1996) (en banc).
332. See id. at 163, 474 S.E.2d at 861.
333. Id. at 165, 474 S.E.2d at 862.

334. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-357 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
335. 23 Va. App. 537, 478 S.E.2d 324 (1996).
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ment phase of the habitual offender proceedings. 6 In Shenk
v. Commonwealth, 7 the Virginia Court of Appeals interpreted
the "agricultural purposes" exception of the statute very narrowly.' The court of appeals held that the "agricultural purposes" exception did not apply to driving a tractor from one
residential yard to another where the tractor was used to mow
lawns." Although the tractor fit the definition of a "farm
tractor" under the statute, residential yards are not considered
lands used for "agricultural purposes."' In Flinchum v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Court of Appeals interpreted the
term "highway" to exclude private parking lots that were not
open to the public at all times. 2
B. Guns
Proof of the use of a firearm in commission of robbery in
violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1 remains a controversial topic. The Virginia Court of Appeals published three opinions on the subject over the past year. The court of appeals
continues to deal with the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion
in Yarborough v. Commonwealth,' which requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant actually had a firearm

336. See id. at 544, 478 S.E.2d at 327.
337. 24 Va. App. 816, 485 S.E.2d 669 (1997).
338. See id. at 819, 485 S.E.2d at 671-72. Virginia Code section 46.2-357 provides
the following exemption:
However, the revocation determination shall not prohibit the person from
operating any farm tractor on the highways when it is necessary to move
the tractor from one tract of land used for agricultural purposes to another tract of land used for agricultural purposes, provided that the distance between the said tracts of land is no more than five miles.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-357 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
339. See Shenk, 24 Va. App. at 820, 485 S.E.2d at 671.
340. See id. The court of appeals looked to other statutes defining "agricultural"
and concluded that residential areas, such as the area where the defendant was arrested, are not "farming" areas, and therefore, the defendant was not engaged in
"agricultural purposes." See id. The dissent argued that because the legislature included mowers within the definition of "farm tractor," the legislature "clearly intended a
person such as Shenk could move his self-propelled mower from one lawn to another
lawn." Id. at 822, 485 S.E.2d at 672 (Benton, J., dissenting).
341. 24 Va. App. 734, 485 S.E.2d 630 (1997).
342. See id at 737-38, 485 S.E.2d at 631-32. The parking lots had posted "no
trespassing" signs. See id.
343. 247 Va. 215, 441 S.E.2d 342 (1994).
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in his possession in order to support a conviction for use of a
firearm in commission of a felony.3 In Miller v. Commonwealth3" a rusty, inoperable gun was held to be a "firearm"
within the meaning of the statute. " In Byers v. Commonwealth,3 47 the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the actual
possession of a firearm may be proven by circumstantial evidence and affirmed the defendant's conviction. ' The en banc
Virginia Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction in
McBride v. Commonwealth,3" where the possession of the gun
was established solely by circumstantial evidence."s
C. Property
In Richardson v. Commonwealth,3 5' the defendant was convicted of four separate larcenies which all occurred on the same
day at the Medical College of Virginia. 2 The defendant was
convicted of taking property from four employees, including two

344. See id. at 218-19, 441 S.E.2d at 343-44.
345. 23 Va. App. 208, 475 S.E.2d 828 (1996).
346. See id. at 212-13, 441 S.E.2d at 830. The evidence was insufficient, however,
to support a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, because the
courts have interpreted "firearm" under that statute to mean an operable firearm.
See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 354, 429 S.E.2d 615, aff'd en banc, 17
Va. App. 233, 436 S.E.2d 192 (1993).
347. 23 Va. App. 146, 474 S.E.2d 852 (1996).
348. See id. at 152, 474 S.E.2d at 855-56. The circumstantial evidence in the case
included: the defendant's statement ("This is a stick up. Don't look back. I['l] butt
you in the head"); the victim's feeling a metal object against his neck which he
thought was a gun; and the defendant's participation in the robbery of another cabdriver with his accomplices seven days before the incident. See id.
The circumstantial evidence which the Supreme Court of Virginia found to be
insufficient in Yarborough included the defendant's statement "This is a stick up" and
the victim's belief, based upon seeing a bulge in the defendant's pocket, that he had
a gun. See Yarborough, 247 Va. at 217-18, 441 S.E.2d at 343-44.
349. 24 Va. App. 603, 484 S.E.2d 165 (1997) (en banc).
350. See id. at 607-08, 484 S.E.2d at 168. The circumstantial evidence in McBride
was the defendant's statement that he would shoot if the victim turned around, and
the victim's testimony that he felt the defendant push something against his back.
See id.
The dissenting judges emphasized that there was also evidence that the defendant was holding a "baby" immediately before the incident and that a blanket and
plastic bottle were found at the scene, supporting the conclusion that the defendant
pushed the plastic bottle and not a gun against the victim's back. See id. at 611-12,
484 S.E.2d at 169-70 (Benton and Elder, JJ., dissenting).
351. 25 Va. App. 491, 489 S.E.2d 697 (1997) (en banc).
352. See id. at 493-95, 489 S.E.2d at 698-99.
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purses from the tenth floor of the North Hospital (one on a
desk and the other ten feet away and concealed by a wall), a
third purse from the second floor of North Hospital, and a
backpack and items from the seventh floor of the West Hospital.3 There was no evidence of the order in which the
items were taken, nor of the time frame in which the defendant
took the items. Evidence was introduced that the walk between the North Hospital and the West Hospital takes five to
eight minutes. The en banc Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed
the separate convictions for the larcenies of items from several
floors or separate buildings of the hospital complex, but held
that the theft of the two purses on the tenth floor constituted a
single larceny." The court of appeals found that the distance
of ten feet did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting under the same impulse to steal at the
time of both thefts. 56
In Catterton v. Commonwealth,357 the defendant was convicted of stealing a car from a repair shop. The Commonwealth
introduced the testimony of the car owner that she gave no one
permission to take her car from the repair shop; no one from
the repair shop testified." The defendant contended that the
evidence did not exclude the inference that the repair shop gave
the defendant permission to take the car."' The Virginia
Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that, for purposes
of larceny, ownership may belong to the true owner or the
owner's bailee and that the testimony of the owner was
sufficient."M
In other cases discussing crimes against property, the en
banc Virginia Court of Appeals held that a prior robbery conviction should not have been considered a prior larceny conviction
under the sentencing enhancement statute, Virginia Code sec353. See id.
354. See id. at 498-99, 489 S.E.2d at 701.
355. See id.
356. See id. at 496-97, 489 S.E.2d at 700.
357. 23 Va. App. 407, 477 S.E.2d 748 (1996).
358. See id. at 409-10, 477 S.E.2d at 749.
359. See id.
360. See id. at 411, 477 S.E.2d at 750. The Commonwealth could have charged larceny from either the owner or the bailee. In this case, the Commonwealth charged
larceny from the owner and the court found the evidence proved that charge. See id.
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tion 18.2-104;"6' "habituality" is not an element of burglary
from a school;.62 a school is an "other house" covered by the
burglary statute, Virginia Code section 18.2-90;" and a bona
fide claim of right is not a defense to extortion?"
D. Sex Offenses
In the only case interpreting the elements of a sex offense,
the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for insufficiency of the evidence." The defendant was charged with
rape of a girl over fourteen, but under fifteen, years old.'
The trial court found that the sexual act did not occur by force,
therefore the issue on appeal was whether sufficient evidence
existed to prove the sexual act occurred "through the use of
[complainant's] mental incapacity" in violation of Virginia Code
section 18.2-61." 87 To convict, the Commonwealth needed to
prove: (1) the complainant was mentally incapacitated at the
time of the offense; (2) the condition prevented her from under361. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 311, 477 S.E.2d 3 (1996), affd en
banc, 24 Va. App. 613, 484 S.E.2d 170 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-104 (Repl. Vol.
1996).
The majority reviewed the legislative history and found that robbery is not a
proper predicate offense because robbery is neither deemed nor punished as larceny
in the Virginia Code. Robbery is properly classified as a crime against the person and
larceny is a crime against property. See Harris, 23 Va. App. at 315-16, 477 S.E.2d at
5.
The dissent argued that larceny is merely a lesser-included offense of robbery,
and therefore, robbery includes all of the necessary elements of larceny. Robbery,
according to the dissent, is the most egregious form of larceny. See id. at 317, 477
S.E.2d at 6 (Moon, J., dissenting).
362. See Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 57, 64, 480 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1997).
The court of appeals interpreted the burglary statute to apply an element of habituality only to dwelling houses of another, automobiles, trucks or trailers. See id.
363. See id. The court of appeals adopted the language of Buie v. Commonwealth,
21 Va. App. 526, 465 S.E.2d 596 (1996), and Dalton v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
544, 418 S.E.2d 563 (1992), to find an "other house" may include any structure, permanently fixed to the ground with walls and a roof, and sufficiently enclosed to be a
barrier to trespass. See Allard, 24 Va. App. at 64, 480 S.E.2d at 142.
364. See Strohecker v. Commonwealth, 23 Va App. 242, 475 S.E.2d 844 (1996). A
bona fide claim of right is a defense to robbery and larceny, because it can negate
the criminal intent necessary, such as the intent to steal. See, e.g., Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 138 S.E.2d 28 (1964); Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800,
133 S.E. 764 (1926).
365. See White v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 593, 478 S.E.2d 713 (1996).
366. See id. at 594, 478 S.E.2d at 713.
367. See id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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standing the nature and consequences of the sexual act; and (3)
that at the time of the offense, the defendant should have
known of the condition.3" The court of appeals held that the
trial court's observations of the complainant two years after the
sexual act occurred were insufficient to support a finding that
the complainant
was mentally incapacitated at the time of the
369
offense.

E. Miscellaneous Offenses
The Virginia Court of Appeals recently held that the stalking
statute, Virginia Code section 18.2-60.3, is not unconstitutionally vague, thus affirming the defendant's conviction on the somewhat sparse evidence of the victim's "fear of death, criminal
sexual assault, or bodily injury."3 0 In order to obtain a conviction under Virginia Code section 18.2-60.3, the Commonwealth
must prove, among other elements, that the defendant's conduct
caused a person to experience reasonable fear of death, criminal
sexual assault, or bodily injury."' At trial, the complainant
testified that the defendant's telephone calls made her "fearful,"
and that she was in constant fear during their past "abusive"
relationship. 2 The court of appeals found that she was
"afraid for her physical well-being" and that the "dynamics of
her relationship with [the defendant]" gave the necessary
support for the trial court's conclusion that "she reasonably
feared bodily injury or one of the other evils listed in Code
[section] 18.2-60.3"" ' The court of appeals also noted the
defendant's prior conviction for stalking indicated that "on at
least one other occasion ...

the victim reasonably fear[ed] for

her physical safety.""7 4 Since there was no evidence that the
abuse in the prior relationship was physical or that the defendant ever threatened physical harm, the defendant's conviction

368.
369.
370.
(1997).
371.
372.
373.

See White, 23 Va. App. at 595, 478 S.E.2d at 713-14.
See id. at 596, 478 S.E.2d at 714.
See Parker v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 681, 683, 485 S.E.2d 150, 151
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
See Parker,24 Va. App. at 683, 485 S.E.2d at 151.
Id. at 686, 485 S.E.2d at 153.

374. Id-
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appears to have been supported mainly by the evidence of the
prior conviction.
In another case, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that Virginia Code section 58.1-4017 requires proof of the defendant's
knowledge that a negotiated ticket has been altered."' Additionally, the Virginia Court of Appeals found that a defendant
can be guilty as a principal in the second degree of unlawfully
wearing a mask even though the defendant's own face was
never obstructed,37 and that charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and transportation of
cocaine into the Commonwealth with intent to distribute do not
require proof that the defendant intended to distribute the
drugs in the Commonwealth.3 77
VII. SENTENCING

Although the Virginia Court of Appeal's opinions were
lengthy and the discussions were full of authority, the law
remained the same-defendants are not entitled to an instruction concerning parole ineligibility in non-capital cases. 78 The
Virginia Court of Appeals recently held that Simmons v. South
379 does not apply to non-capital proceedings, even if
Carolina
the Commonwealth argues at sentencing that the defendant is
a threat to society.3" Given the long line of cases holding that
parole considerations are not properly considered by the jury,
the position of the courts is not likely to change absent a mandate from the legislature or the United States Supreme Court.
However, the Virginia Court of Appeals recently determined
that the legislature changed the law in the Commonwealth
375. See Carlton v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 629, 633, 478 S.E.2d 730, 732
(1996). The Commonwealth argued that a presumption should apply, similar to cases
involving presentation of bad checks, entitling the fact finder to presume the defendant knew the ticket was altered. The court of appeals disagreed and likened the
offense to uttering a counterfeit note under Virginia Code section 18.2-170. See id.
376. See McGill v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 728, 733, 485 S.E.2d 173, 175
(1997).
377. See Seke v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 318, 322, 482 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1997).
378. See Walker v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 50, 486 S.E.2d 126 (1997); Mosby
v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 284, 482 S.E.2d 72 (1997).
379. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
380. See Mosby, 24 Va. App. at 289, 482 S.E.2d at 74.
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concerning the role of jury sentencing under Virginia Code
section 19.2-295.2, which authorizes the trial court to impose an
additional suspended term of imprisonment conditioned on the
m
With the passage of
completion of post-release supervision."
Virginia Code section 19.2-295.2, the legislature changed the old
rule where the jury sets the maximum sentence. 82 The court
of appeals held that two sentencing principles still apply: (1)
sentencing procedures are a matter of legislative determination;
and (2) under Virginia's statutory scheme, the jury's recommendation is not final or absolute.}
The principle that sentences recommended by juries are not
final was affirmed and relied upon by the Virginia Court of
Appeals in Shifflett v. Commonwealth' to affirm the trial
court's ruling which prohibited certain evidence from being
introduced to the jury during the sentencing phase.3 m' The defendant wanted to introduce economic evidence regarding his
employment and family responsibilities. 6 The majority characterized this evidence as an illustration of the economic effect
of incarceration on his family, and found that this evidence did
not bear on the declared purposes of punishment" and did
not fit within the statutory definition of mitigation evidence.tm
The court of appeals stressed that the case concerned the admission to evidence to the jury, whose sentence was not final,
as opposed to the admission of evidence to the trial court."
The dissent argued that the evidence properly reflected the

381. See Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 57, 480 S.E.2d 139 (1997); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
382. See Allard, 24 Va. App. at 68, 480 S.E.2d at 144.
383. See id. at 67, 480 S.E.2d at 144 (citing Duncan v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App.
342, 344-45, 343 S.E.2d 392, 393-94 (1986)).
384. 24 Va. App. 538, 484 S.E.2d 134 (1997).
385. See id. at 540, 484 S.E.2d at 135.
386. See id.
387. The declared purposes of punishment are deterrence (general and specific),
incapacitation, retribution and rehabilitation. See id. at 542, 484 S.E.2d at 136.
388. See id. at 543, 484 S.E.2d at 136. The court of appeals examined the capital
sentencing statutes for a definition of mitigation evidence and found that although
the list of factors is not exclusive, the enumerated factors all reflected "the
defendant's history or background or circumstances surrounding the crime." Id. (citing
Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 253, 257 S.E.2d 797, 804 (1979)).
389. See id. at 544 n.3, 484 S.E.2d at 137 n.3.
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defendant's character as a caring, responsible family man who
supported his family, and should have been admitted.s"'
With the reform in the criminal procedure statutes enabling
juries to consider prior convictions during the sentencing phase,
the trial courts encountered problems determining whether the
Commonwealth presented proper proof of the convictions in
several recent cases. In four cases, the Virginia Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory language of Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1 concerning the admission of "certified, attested
or exemplified copies of the record of conviction." 9' In Brooks
v. Commonwealth,39 2 the court of appeals held that properly
certified copies of the indictments are relevant and admissible
as part of the "record of conviction" where the final order of
judgment states that the defendant had been found guilty "as
charged in the indictments.""3 Similarly, in Folson v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals held that the "record of
conviction" is not limited to a copy of the final order, but may
be any "record" evidencing the conviction. 95
This holding appears to contradict the court of appeals' decision in Bellinger v. Commonwealth," remanding a case for
resentencing because a bad check conviction form did not comply with the statutory requirements of Virginia Code section
19.2-307 for final orders. 97

390. See id. at 548-49, 484 S.E.2d at 139 (Benton, J., dissenting).
391. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
392. 24 Va. App. 523, 484 S.E.2d 127 (1997).
393. Id- at 533, 484 S.E.2d at 131.
394. 23 Va. App. 521, 478 S.E.2d 316 (1996).
395. See id. at 526, 478 S.E.2d at 318-19. The Commonwealth introduced the indictment and "docket entries" for one conviction and the "commitment record" for
another conviction. The records indicated the convictions and the sentence to be
served. See id. at 523-24, 478 S.E.2d at 317.
396. 23 Va. App. 471, 477 S.E.2d 779 (1996).
397. See id. at 474, 477 S.E.2d at 780. Virginia Code section 19.2-307 provides:
The judgment order shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings and
the adjudication and sentence, whether or not the case was tried by a
jury, and if not, whether the consent of the accused was concurred in by
the court and the attorney for the Commonwealth. If the accused is
found not guilty, or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged,
judgment shall be entered accordingly.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-307 (Curn. Supp. 1997).
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VIII. APPEALS

In the past year, the Virginia Court of Appeals found numerous waivers by trial and appellate counsel of arguments on
appeal.398 Particularly noteworthy, however, are the instances
when the court of appeals did not bar review of the issue, even
though the objections were either nonexistent or incomplete.
In Cudjoe v. Commonwealth,"' the Commonwealth objected
to the defendant's peremptory strike of a white juror. The trial
court required the defendant to explain his reasons for the
strike. After the trial court disallowed the strike, the defendant
did not object to the trial court's ruling.4" The Virginia Court
of Appeals found that the purpose of Virginia Supreme Court
Rule 5A.18 had not been violated because the trial court had
the positions of both parties clearly before it and fully understood the issue involved."'
In Herrera v. Commonwealth,"2 involving a prosecution under the "possible endangerment" clause of the child endangerment statute, the defendant failed to raise any objection to the
constitutionality of the statute at trial, on brief, or in argument
on appeal. °3 In another case decided while Herrera's case was
pending on direct appeal, the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that the "possible endangerment" clause of the statute was
unconstitutionally vague."' Regarding Herrera's case, the
court of appeals found that because the unconstitutionality of
the statute affected the jurisdiction of the trial court, the court
of appeals could address the issue sua sponte. 4°5 The court of
appeals then reversed Herrera's conviction.4 "6
398. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 401, 480 S.E.2d 853 (1997)
(holding that failure to include written argument in brief on issue constitutes a waiver and bars review of the issue); Strohecker v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 242, 475
S.E.2d 844 (1996) (finding no proffer of excluded testimony, and, therefore, no basis
for review).
399. 23 Va. App. 193, 475 S.E.2d 821 (1996).
400. See id at 196, 475 S.E.2d at 822.
401. See iU. at 197, 475 S.E.2d at 822.
402. 24 Va. App. 490, 483 S.E.2d 492 (1997).
403. See id. at 492, 483 S.E.2d at 493.
404. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 Va. App. 150, 462 S.E.2d 582 (1995).
405. See Herrera, 24 Va. App. at 496, 483 S.E.2d at 495.
406. See id.; see also Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 38, 473 S.E.2d 724
(1996) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived at any time).
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CONCLUSION

Writing a summary of the law is an exercise that every attorney should do at least once. Reviewing a year's worth of cases
from the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia Court of
Appeals provides an indication of what areas of the law are of
current interest to the appellate courts. Such a review reminds
prudent counsel of the importance of adequately preserving
issues and preparing a record that best presents the case. Reviewing the law is a reminder, too, that effective appellate
advocacy can be an invaluable factor in the resolution of an
appeal.

